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Carbon taxes and emissions trading systems (ETSs) to limit
emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) are increasingly common. At the
end of 2015, 17 GHG ETSs were operational in 55 jurisdictions, and 18
jurisdictions collected at least one carbon tax. This paper assesses the
performance of carbon taxes and ETSs with respect to environmental
effectiveness (reduction of emissions regulated by the instrument), costeffectiveness (marginal abatement cost), economic efficiency, public
finance, and administrative issues.
Data on emissions subject to carbon taxes are rarely reported. We
estimate the taxed emissions for 17 taxes in 12 jurisdictions from 1991
through the end of 2015. All 17 taxes have reduced emissions relative to
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business-as-usual. Six of the jurisdictions actually reduced emissions,
although in at least three of those jurisdictions the reductions appear to
be due to other policies. The small sizes of reduction in almost all 17
cases are partially due to the low tax rates; the modest and uncertain
changes in tax rates over time; and the limited response of taxed sources,
such as fossil fuels, to price changes.
Actual emissions declined for at least six of 10 ETSs. Other policies
and developments, such as the 2009 recession, contributed to the
reductions, but estimates of the share of the reduction attributable to the
instrument are rare. All of the ETSs have accumulated banks of surplus
allowances and most have implemented measures to reduce these banks.
On average, the marginal cost of compliance is substantially lower for
ETSs than carbon taxes.
ETS experience has been shared bilaterally and via dedicated
institutions. As a result, most ETSs have increased the share of
allowances auctioned; adopted declining emissions caps; specified future
caps and floor prices several years into the future; shifted to
benchmarking for free allowance allocations to emissions-intensive,
trade-exposed (EITE) sources; reduced accessibility to foreign offset
credits; and established market stability reserves. By contrast, there is
little evidence of shared learning and virtually no change to the design of
carbon taxes. We found no jurisdiction that routinely tracks the taxed
emissions. Very few jurisdictions regularly assess the effectiveness of the
tax in achieving emission reductions. Additionally, adjustments to the
tax rate often are unpredictable after an introductory period of three to
five years.
Both instruments reduce emissions, but ETSs have performed
better than carbon taxes on the principal criteria of environmental
effectiveness and cost-effectiveness. Many jurisdictions have
implemented both a carbon tax and a GHG ETS, and every jurisdiction
that has adopted either instrument has also implemented other policies.
More research is needed to improve the design of both instruments and
their interaction with non-market-based carbon policies because the use
of multiple instruments produces complex interactive and distributional
effects. While economically inefficient, market-based policies should be
supplemented by non-market-based policies to ensure sustained political
support.
INTRODUCTION
Whether carbon taxes or greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
trading systems (ETSs) are more effective at reducing GHG emissions
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has been widely debated in climate policy literature.1 Lacking from this
debate is empirical evidence documenting the performance of these
instruments. This paper fills the gap by providing such evidence.
Economic theory indicates that pricing 2 GHG 3 emissions can
minimize the cost to society of reducing emissions and so mitigating
climate change. Carbon taxes and ETSs are two ways to price GHG
emissions. A carbon tax imposes a price—the tax rate specified by the
government—on each metric ton of GHGs emitted, measured as
metric ton of carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO2e), but does not limit
overall emissions.4 A cap-and-trade system—the most common form
of ETS—imposes a government-established limit on aggregate GHG
emissions by specified sources, distributes tradable allowances (usually
one tCO2e each) approximately equal to the limit, and requires
regulated emitters to submit allowances equal to their actual
emissions.5 The market determines the price for allowances and thus
the price per tCO2e emitted. A baseline-and-credit system—a less
common form of ETS—specifies an absolute emissions or emissions
intensity limit for each participant and allocates tradable credits
(“allowances”) to emitters who emit less than their limits. Emitters that
exceed their limits can purchase credits from other participants to
cover the excess emissions. Again, the market determines the price per
tCO2e emitted.

1. See, e.g., SHI-LING HSU, THE CASE FOR A CARBON TAX: GETTING PAST OUR HANGUPS TO EFFECTIVE CLIMATE POLICY 5–7 (2012); WORLD BANK P’SHIP FOR MARKET
READINESS, CARBON TAX GUIDE: A HANDBOOK FOR POLICY MAKERS 34 (2017); Michael
Goldblatt, Comparison of Emissions Trading and Carbon Taxation in South Africa, 10 CLIMATE
POL’Y 511, 512–13 (2011); Michael G. Pollitt, A Global Carbon Market? 7 (Energy Pol’y Research
Grp., Univ. Cambridge, Working Paper No. 1608, 2016).
2. See, e.g., Andrea Baranzini et al., Carbon Pricing in Climate Policy: Seven Reasons,
Complementary Instruments, and Political Economy Considerations, 8 WIRES CLIMATE
CHANGE, Dec. 2017, 3–6 [hereinafter Seven Reasons].
3. There are numerous GHGs. Carbon dioxide (CO2) is the most voluminous and least
potent. Emissions of other GHGs are often measured in terms of tons of CO2 equivalence
(tCO2e) usually based on their radiative forcing relative to CO2 over 100 years. See SUSAN
SOLOMON ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 33 (2007).
4. A carbon tax is a tax per tCO2e applied to fossil fuels and/or GHG emitting activities.
In this paper, taxes on fossil fuels not related to the GHG emissions due to combustion of the fuel
are not considered to be carbon taxes.
5. The quantity of allowances distributed may be less than the established limit because
some allowances may be withheld for various purposes, such as allocations to new entrants, or
because they are not purchased at allowance auctions. Allowances in excess of the cap may be
distributed as transitional mechanisms, such as credit for early action, or to limit price increases
when allowance prices exceed specified thresholds.
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A carbon tax and an ETS would yield identical results for
equivalent emission reductions if there is no uncertainty regarding
future prices, perfect competition in all markets, no interaction with
other policies, and universal coverage (all sources of GHG emissions).
In practice, the performance of carbon taxes differs from that of ETSs
because these assumptions never hold. In a given jurisdiction, various
factors including taxation authority, the emissions profile, and
influence of large emitters can affect the choice and design of an
instrument. Thus, the designs of carbon taxes and GHG ETSs, as well
as their performance, vary across jurisdictions.
The performance of a carbon tax or ETS as implemented is further
affected by some of the jurisdiction’s other emissions-related policies,
such as fuel taxes, energy efficiency standards, and renewable energy
incentives.6 External factors, such as economic recessions, fossil fuel
prices, and natural disasters, 7 can affect the emission reductions
achieved by a tax or ETS.8
This paper assesses the performance of carbon taxes and GHG
ETSs operational at the end of 2015.9 These instruments are assessed
for environmental effectiveness (reduction of actual emissions), costeffectiveness (marginal abatement cost), economic efficiency, public
finance, and administrative issues. We do not make any causal claims
between the observed emission reductions in a jurisdiction and its
choice of policy instrument because, as noted above, many other
factors affect actual emissions. The data and resources needed to
disentangle the contribution of the instrument from the other factors
were not available for this research. Nevertheless, useful insights can
be drawn about the performance of the carbon taxes and GHG ETSs
implemented to date.

6. See generally OECD, INTERACTIONS BETWEEN EMISSION TRADING SYSTEMS AND
OTHER OVERLAPPING POLICY INSTRUMENTS (2011) (describing interactions between emissions
trading schemes and other policy tools); Baranzini et al., supra note 2, at 6–7.
7. See, e.g., Martin Fackler, Nuclear Power Nears Standstill for the Japanese, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 8, 2012, at A1 (describing dip in nuclear power production after Fukushima earthquake and
tsunami).
8. For example, the economic recession of 2009 reduced GHG emissions by sources subject
to several carbon taxes (see Annex 1). A decline in natural gas prices in the US due to shale gas
production led to fuel switching and lower emissions by Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI) participants. Brian C. Murray & Peter T. Maniloff, Why Have Greenhouse Emissions in
RGGI States Declined? An Econometric Attribution to Economic, Energy Market, and Policy
Factors, 51 ENERGY ECON. 581, 583–84 (2015).
9. Taxes and ETSs that are no longer operational, such as Australia’s carbon pricing
mechanism that was repealed in 2014 are not included in the analysis. Clean Energy Legislation
(Carbon Tax Repeal) Act 2014 (Austl.) (repealing the Clean Energy Act 2011).
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The performance of many of the instruments implemented has
been assessed from several different perspectives and with varying
degrees of rigor, including those implemented by Alberta, British
Columbia, California, Denmark, European Union ETS, Finland,
Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI), Sweden, and Switzerland. 10 In addition to assessments of
individual instruments, a few studies review the performance of
multiple instruments including the seven Chinese pilot ETSs,11 ETSs
for GHGs and other pollutants,12 carbon taxes in multiple European
countries, 13 and carbon taxes and GHG ETSs in eighteen
jurisdictions.14
This article proceeds as follows. Section I identifies the carbon
taxes and GHG ETSs implemented before the end of 2015. Section II
discusses the effect of real-world considerations on instrument choice
and design. Criteria to evaluate the instruments are proposed in
Section III. The changes in emissions subject to the carbon taxes and
GHG ETSs implemented to-date are summarized in Sections IV and
V, respectively. Our assessment of the performance of these
instruments in practice appears in Section VI. Section VII concludes.
I. CARBON TAXES AND GHG ETSS IMPLEMENTED BY THE END OF
2015
Our analysis is limited to the instruments operational at the end of
2015 because sufficient data to assess the performance of more recently
implemented instruments are not available. Subsequent market-based
emissions policy implementations include carbon taxes adopted in
Alberta (Canada), Chile, and Columbia in 2017 and ETSs
10. Summaries of the assessments are provided in section IV.B for taxes and section V.C for
ETSs.
11. See generally Zhe Deng et al., Effectiveness of Pilot Carbon Emissions Trading Systems
in China, 18 CLIMATE POL’Y 992 (2018); Jun Dong et al., From Pilot to the National Emissions
Trading Scheme in China: International Practice and Domestic Experiences, 8 SUSTAINABILITY
522 (2016); Maosheng Duan et al., Review of Carbon Emissions Trading Pilots in China, 25
ENERGY & ENV. 527 (2014); Junjie Zhang et al., Lessons Learned from China’s Regional Carbon
Market Pilots, 6 ECON. ENERGY & ENVTL. POL’Y 1 (2017).
12. See generally Richard Schmalensee & Robert N. Stavins, Lessons Learned from Three
Decades of Experience with Cap-and-Trade, 11 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 59 (2017).
13. See generally TORBEN MIDEKSA & STEFFEN KALLBEKKEN, CTR. FOR INT’L CLIMATE
AND ENVTL. RESEARCH, THE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTIVENESS OF CARBON TAXES; Mikael
Skou Andersen, Europe’s Experience with Carbon-Energy Taxation, 3 S.A.P.I.EN.S, Dec. 2010;
Boqiang Lin & Xuehui Li, The Effect of Carbon Tax on Per Capita CO2 Emissions, 39 ENERGY
POL’Y 5137 (2011).
14. See EASWARAN NARASSIMHAN ET AL., CARBON PRICING IN PRACTICE: A REVIEW OF
THE EVIDENCE (Climate Policy Lab, The Fletcher Sch., Tufts Univ., No. 015, 2017).
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implemented in Fuijan (China) in 2016 and Ontario (Canada) in 2017.
Among them, Alberta’s ETS—the Specified Gas Emitters Regulation
(SGER)—has been replaced by an updated emissions intensity
baseline and credit ETS;15 the Ontario ETS was terminated by a new
provincial government in 2018; 16 and though British Columbia
(Canada) has passed legislation that enables the establishment of a
baseline-and-credit ETS, the system has not yet been operationalized.
17

At the end of 2015, GHG ETSs were operational in 55
jurisdictions (34 national and 21 sub-national),18 and 18 jurisdictions
(17 national and one sub-national) collected at least one carbon tax.
Table 1 lists these jurisdictions and their policy instruments. 19 ETSs
were implemented in a greater number of jurisdictions and covered a
greater percentage of priced emissions than carbon taxes. Of the 6,059
MtCO2e annual emissions covered by a carbon price at the end of 2015,
ETSs covered 4,286 MtCO2e (71%), while carbon taxes covered 1,773
MtCO2e (29%). 20 Although ETSs are more common, they were
adopted much later than carbon taxes. The first carbon taxes were
adopted in 1990, while the first GHG ETS still in effect was not
implemented until 2005.
The average share of a jurisdiction’s emissions covered by an ETS
(48.0%) is a little higher than the average for a carbon tax (45.7%).21
The share of emissions covered ranges from 18% to 85% for ETSs and
from 3% to 70% for carbon taxes. The average tax rate (USD 13.04

15. Sharon Mascher, Striving for Equivalency Across the Alberta, British Columbia, Ontario
and Québec Carbon Pricing Systems: The Pan-Canadian Carbon Pricing Benchmark, 18 CLIMATE
POL’Y 1012, 1015 (2018). As of 2017, the fixed price compliance option under the revised system
was CAD 30, the price shown in Table 1. As this paper focuses on ETSs operational in 2015,
unless otherwise specified, statements relating to Alberta’s ETS refer to the SGER. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. The EU ETS covers 31 national jurisdictions (the 28 member states plus Iceland,
Norway and Liechtenstein) and RGGI covers nine American states (Connecticut, Delaware,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont).
19. Although not listed by the sources used for Table 1, Croatia has applied a carbon tax to
emissions by large stationary sources since 2007. The tax was revised to exclude sources covered
by the EU ETS when Croatia joined in 2013. In addition, since July 2013, New Zealand has
imposed a levy on imports, such as air conditioners, that contain synthetic GHGs. Bulk imports
of synthetic GHGs are covered by the ETS. N.Z. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2017 SYNTHETIC
GREENHOUSE GAS LEVY REPORT (2017).
20. MtCO2e is equal to one million tCO2e.
21. These are weighted averages; the share for each jurisdiction is weighted by the emissions
covered by the instrument in that jurisdiction. The average tax rates and allowance prices are
calculated in the same way.
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/tCO2e) is over 65% higher than the average ETS allowance price
(USD 7.79 /tCO2e). Furthermore, the range of tax rates—from less
than USD 1 to USD 140—is much broader than the range of allowance
prices—from less than USD 1 to USD 24.
Most of the jurisdictions with a carbon tax also have an ETS,
usually covering different sources. Fourteen of the countries with a
carbon tax participate in the EU ETS.22 Switzerland and Alberta, since
2018, also have both a tax and an ETS. 23 As noted above, British
Columbia has passed legislation to establish a baseline-and-credit ETS
to complement its carbon tax, but this system currently is not
operational. 24 Japan and Mexico only have taxes. 25 South Korea, as
well as all sub-national jurisdictions other than Alberta and British
Columbia, only have an ETS.26

22. Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, and the UK.
23. For Switzerland, see NARASSIMHAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 6–7. For Alberta, see
Mascher, supra note 15, at 1013.
24. Mascher, supra note 15, at 1015.
25. Mexico will start an ETS simulation in preparation of its pilot ETS launch in 2018.
WORLD BANK, STATE AND TRENDS OF CARBON PRICING 2017 11 (2017).
26. INT’L CARBON ACTION P’SHIP (“ICAP”), EMISSIONS TRADING WORLDWIDE: STATUS
REPORT 2018 (Johannes Ackva et al. eds., 2017), https://icapcarbonaction.com/en/publications
[hereinafter, EMISSIONS TRADING WORLDWIDE].
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Range

Year
Launched
Jurisdiction
Finland
1990
Poland
1990
Norway
1991
Sweden
1991
Denmark
1992
Slovenia
1996
Estonia
2000
Latvia
2004
British Columbia
2008
Liechtenstein
2008
Switzerland
2008
Ireland
2010
Iceland
2010
Japan
2012
UK
2013
France
2014
Mexico
2014
Portugal
2015
Average

Emissions Trading Systems

Emissions
Share of
Price
Tax Rate Share of Emissions
Emissions Covered by
August
August Emissions Covered by
the ETS
Covered
2017
the Tax
Year
Covered
2017
MtCO2e
(%)
MtCO2e
Jurisdiction
Launched USD/tCO2
(%)
USD/tCO2
69 - 73
36
21 European Union
2005
6
45
1,963
<1
4
16 Alberta
2007
24
45
118
4 - 56
60
32 New Zealand
2008
13
51
40
140
42
22 Switzerland
2008
7
35
17
27
45
23 RGGI (USA)
2009
4
20
86
20
24
4 Saitama
2011
14
18
7
2
3
1 California
2013
15
85
365
5
15
2 Tokyo
2010
14
20
10
24
70
42 Quebec
2013
15
85
66
87
26
0 Beijing
2013
8
40
5
87
35
17 Guangdong
2013
2
60
388
24
33
20 Shanghai
2013
5
57
170
12
55
3 Shenzhen
2013
6
40
30
3
70
913 Tianjin
2013
1
55
100
24
25
122 Chongqing
2014
<1
40
126
36
40
186 Hubei
2014
2
35
324
1-3
46
332 South Korea
2015
18
68
470
8
26
18
Total
Average
Total
USD 13.04 45.69%
USD 7.79 48.01%
< USD 1 to 3% to
< USD 1 to 18% to
Range
1,774
4,286
USD 140
70%
USD 24
85%

Carbon Taxes
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Table 1. Information on Carbon Taxes and GHG Emissions Trading
Systems in Operation at the end of 201527

27. August 2017 prices are from WORLD BANK, supra note 25. Shares of emissions covered
are from CLÉMENT MÉTIVIER ET AL., GLOBAL PANORAMA OF CARBON PRICES IN 2017 3 (2017),
https://www.i4ce.org/publications-2/. For the EU and national jurisdictions, the emissions covered
by the instrument are calculated from national emissions excluding LULUCF for 2016 reported
by the UNFCCC Greenhouse Gas Inventory and the share of emissions covered by the
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II. INSTRUMENT CHOICE AND DESIGN REFLECT REAL WORLD
CONSIDERATIONS
A variety of legal, political, and economic factors influence the
choice and design of a jurisdiction’s emissions policy. Constitutional
authority or political considerations may limit the instrument choices.
Members of the European Union and European Economic Area, for
example, must join the EU ETS. 28 In California, an ETS is more
politically feasible because it only requires 50% of the legislature to
approve, compared to two thirds of the legislature when it comes to
taxes.29
Administrative feasibility also plays a role in a jurisdiction’s choice
of policy instruments. An ETS needs administrative infrastructure,
including an allowance registry and allowance market supervision,
while much of the infrastructure needed by a tax may already exist. An
ETS also requires a competitive market for allowances, meaning a
large number of participants with no dominant firms. Thus, a carbon
tax may be better suited to a small jurisdiction or a developing country
with limited administrative capacity. In some cases, a small jurisdiction
can address these issues by joining an ETS covering multiple
jurisdictions. Examples include Malta in the EU ETS and New
Hampshire in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI).

instrument. Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data—Detailed Data by Party, UN FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://di.unfccc.int/detailed_data_by_party. For Alberta,
British Columbia, and Quebec, total emissions for 2016 are from ENV’T. & CLIMATE CHANGE
CANADA, NATIONAL INVENTORY REPORT 1990–2016—GREENHOUSE GAS SOURCES AND
SINKS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 6 (2018). California total emissions for 2016 are from CAL AIR
RESOURCES BD, CALIFORNIA GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FOR 2000–2016 1 (2018). For other
GHG ETSs, the emissions covered are from the ICAP fact sheets for the respective systems in
ICAP, supra note 26.
28. For a description of the legislative process governing the EU ETS and its
implementation by member states, see EUROPEAN COMM’N, EU ETS HANDBOOK 9–11 (2015).
Article 4 of Directive 2003/87/EC establishing the EU ETS, requires Member States to ensure
that, from January 1, 2005, no installation undertakes any activity listed in Annex I of the
Directive resulting in emissions specified in relation to that activity unless its operator holds a
permit issued by a competent authority. Council Directive 87/EC, art. 4, 2003 O.J. (L275/32) (EC).
29. Guri Bang et al., California’s Cap-and-Trade System: Diffusion and Lessons, 17 GLOBAL
ENVTL. POL. 12, 26 (2017) (“California law requires a two-thirds legislative majority for the
passage of new taxes, but ‘regulatory fees’ require only a simple majority.”). Opponents
challenged the ETS on the ground that the auction revenue was a tax, but this argument was
unsuccessful. See, e.g., Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. State Air Res. Bd., 10 Cal. App. 5th 604,
649–50 (2017). Legislation to extend the ETS to 2030 was passed with a greater than two-thirds
majority. Zeke Hausfather, Explainer: California’s New ‘Cap-and-Trade’ Scheme to Cut
Emissions, CARBONBRIEF (July 28, 2017, 1:35 PM), https://www.carbonbrief.org/explainercalifornias-new-cap-and-trade-scheme-to-cut-emissions.
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Conceptually, a carbon tax imposes a uniform tax per tCO2e
emitted. In practice, a carbon tax is usually implemented as a series of
taxes on various fossil fuels and emitting activities.30 Tax rates of USD
0.0259 per liter of diesel and USD 0.0202 per m3 of natural gas, for
example, both correspond to a tax of USD 10/tCO2.31 As in Finland and
Sweden, the tax rate per tCO2e may differ by fuel and activity. Any tax
on fossil fuels can be expressed in terms of a tax per tCO2e based on
the carbon content of the fuel. 32 This results in disagreements as to
whether a tax is a carbon tax, including India’s tax on coal, the UK’s
fossil fuel levy and climate change levy, and the taxes adopted by the
Netherlands in 1996.33 A carbon tax raises additional implementation
issues such as coverage, tax base, reporting requirements, and use of
revenue. For example, emissions-intensive, trade-exposed (EITE)
installations may be tax exempt or be eligible for refunds. Taxpayers
typically are required to report the quantity of each fuel/activity subject
to the tax and the tax payable, but not the associated emissions.34
Existing ETSs, with the exception of New Zealand, use one of two
basic designs. The more common cap-and-trade design, such as the EU
ETS, imposes a government-established cap on aggregate GHG
emissions by specified sources, distributes tradable allowances (1
tCO2e each) approximately equal to the cap, and requires regulated
emitters to submit allowances or other compliance units equal to their
actual emissions.35 Under the baseline-and-credit design, such as the
30. WORLD BANK P’SHIP FOR MARKET READINESS, supra note 1, at 10.
31. When fossil fuel is burned, virtually all of the carbon is emitted as CO2, so it is possible
to express the tax on CO2 emissions as an equivalent tax on the carbon content of the fuel. See,
e.g.,
2016
Carbon
Conversion
Factors,
CARBON
FOOTPRINT
(2016),
https://www.carbonfootprint.com/2016_carbon_conversion_factors.html. The UK government’s
conversion factors for GHG reporting are 2.67620 kg CO2e per liter for 100% mineral diesel fuel
and 2.02838 kg CO2e per cubic meter of natural gas (“Fuels” sheet). Thus, 373.6640 liters of diesel
yield emissions of 1 tCO2e (1000 (kg/ton)/2.67620 (kg/liter)). Id. Similarly, 493.00365 cubic meters
of natural gas yield emissions of 1 tCO2e. Id. A tax of USD 10/tCO2e therefore is equivalent to a
tax of USD 0.02676 per liter of diesel fuel (USD 10/373.6640) and USD 0.020284 per cubic meter
of natural gas). Id.
32. See OECD, TAXING ENERGY USE 2018 27–35 (2018) (expressing the effective tax rate
due to all taxes on a fuel in different countries in terms of the tax per tCO2e).
33. The Dutch tax rates were USD 6.82/tCO2e for coal, USD 77.89 for light fuel oil, and
USD 110.21 for natural gas thus creating an incentive to increase rather than reduce GHG
emissions (use more coal rather than natural gas). See Érick Lachapelle, Energy Security and
Climate Change Policy in the OECD: The Political Economy of Carbon-Energy Taxation 95,
tbl.3.2.2 (2018) (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Toronto) (on file with journal).
34. See, e.g., B.C. Ministry of Finance, Self Assessors’ Carbon Tax Return (Form FIN 112)
(2018) (British Columbia carbon tax self-reporting return form).
35. The quantity of allowances distributed may be less than or greater than the cap. For a
detailed description of the EU ETS, see EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 28.
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Tokyo ETS, the regulator sets an emissions limit for each participant.
In practice, baseline-and-credit ETSs allocate free “allowances” to
market participants: a participant whose actual emissions are below its
limit receives tradable credits for the difference, while a participant
whose emissions exceed its limit must submit purchased credits or
other compliance units equal to its excess emissions.36 In this design,
the emissions limit may be absolute or be determined by the
participant’s output and an emissions intensity standard. ETSs of either
type may differ in terms of other design features, including coverage,
length of the compliance period, and price stability mechanisms.
Many ETSs allow participants to use credits issued for emission
reductions outside the coverage of the trading program (“offset
credits” or “offsets”) for compliance. 37 Those ETSs typically specify
activities eligible to generate credits and limit the quantity of credits
that may be used for compliance. Some ETSs restrict the use of offset
credits to those generated in the same jurisdiction, while others allow
the use of imported units. 38 The Chinese pilots, for example, accept
only offset credits generated by projects in China (Chinese Certified
Emission Reductions, CCERs),39 and the EU ETS allows only credits
issued by the Clean Development Mechanism or Joint Implementation
mechanism subject to various qualitative and quantitative restrictions
that have changed over time.40
Once a jurisdiction selects an instrument, many design issues need
to be resolved, especially the sources and emissions covered and the

36. In effect, the sum of the limits of all participants is the cap on aggregate emissions.
Changes to the participant population automatically adjust the cap on aggregate emissions. In
contrast, in a “cap-and-trade” system, the cap usually is not adjusted for changes to the number
of sources.
37. See Erik Haites, Experience with Linking Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Systems,
5 WIRES ENERGY ENV’T 246, 247 (2016) (“Two ETS are linked if a participant in one system can
use an allowance or a credit (compliance instrument) issued by either system for compliance.”).
38. Between 2008 and 2014, the New Zealand ETS allowed unlimited use of specified
imported units. The Swiss ETS and EU ETS accepted imported units subject to qualitative and
quantitative restrictions between 2008 and 2012. See id. at tbls.1–3 (collecting data on the use of
imported credits by the New Zealand, Swiss, and EU ETSs). The Chinese pilot trading programs
only accept offset credits (CCERs) awarded for eligible emission reduction projects in China.
DIMITRI DE BOER ET AL., CHINA CARBON FORUM, THE 2017 CHINA CARBON PRICING SURVEY
4 n. 4 (2017).
39. Deng et al., supra note 11, at 992.
40. The Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation are mechanisms
established by the Kyoto Protocol that award internationally recognized credits for emission
reductions achieved by projects in respectively developing and developed countries. For rules on
the use of such credits by participants in the EU ETS, see EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 28, at
96.
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treatment of emissions-intensive, trade-exposed (EITE) installations
that face competition from firms in jurisdictions with weaker (or no)
policies to limit GHG emissions. All instruments exclude some
emissions for administrative reasons—emissions that are difficult to
measure, such as forests and agriculture, 41 and small emissions by
numerous sources, such as emissions from landfills.42 Emissions may
also be excluded for policy reasons, most often those of the agricultural
sector. In practice, the share of a jurisdiction’s emissions covered
ranges from 18% to 85% for ETSs and from 3% to 70% for taxes.43
Imposing a carbon tax or ETS compliance obligation on an EITE
firm can have adverse economic and environmental consequences. The
instrument imposes a cost on the firm and makes it less competitive
relative to similar firms in jurisdictions with weaker GHG emission
limitation policies. Production and associated emissions may shift to
the jurisdiction with the weaker policy (“leakage”), reducing the
anticipated environmental benefits and imposing economic costs on
the jurisdiction implementing the more stringent policy. 44 Thus,
virtually all instruments have provisions to protect EITE firms. In the
case of taxes, provisions include exemptions, differential tax rates,
rebates, and other support. 45 With an ETS, protective provisions
include free allowances (emissions limit in a baseline and credit
system) and rebates.46
Furthermore, almost all ETSs include some price stability
provisions to alleviate the uncertainty of emitters’ compliance cost.47

41. The New Zealand ETS is an exception. It includes forests and requires emissions
reporting by agriculture. N.Z. MINISTRY FOR THE ENV’T, NO. ME 1129, THE NEW ZEALAND
EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME EVALUATION 2016 9 tbl.2 (2016).
42. Some emissions can be included indirectly; regulating the emissions of electricity
generators and residential fuel suppliers, for example, covers virtually all household emissions.
Partial coverage of excluded sources is also possible by allowing entities to earn offset credits for
verified emission reductions.
43. See supra Table 1.
44. For a review, see Frédéric Brangar & Philippe Quirion, Climate Policy and the “Carbon
Haven” Effect, 5 WIRES CLIMATE CHANGE 53 (2014) (“Most ex ante modeling studies conclude
to leakage rates in the range of 5–20% (if no option to mitigate leakage is implemented), whereas
ex post econometric studies have not revealed statistically significant evidence of leakage.”).
45. WORLD BANK P’SHIP FOR MARKET READINESS, supra note 1, at 18.
46. See EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 28, at 60 (outlining the provisions of the EU ETS
to address leakage and listing several studies that attempt to estimate leakage for vulnerable
sectors covered by the ETS).
47. In a cap-and-trade ETS, for example, emitters must submit allowances equal to their
actual emissions to achieve compliance. An emitter’s actual emissions during a period depend in
part on its output which is uncertain. The cost of the allowances needed depends on the quantity
received free and the quantities purchased at auction and at market prices with both auction and
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Typically, these provisions include the ability to use offset credits from
outside the cap for compliance and the sale of additional allowances at
specified levels up to a price ceiling.48 In a few ETSs, such as Alberta
and New Zealand, the price ceiling takes the form of a fixed price
compliance option. Some ETSs also set a minimum price. A minimum
price and a price ceiling together establish a “price collar”.
Implementing a tax or ETS raises issues on how to treat industries
whose prices are regulated, such as taxis and electric utilities. In the
case of transportation fuels, the cost of the tax or ETS allowances
increases the price of fuel, and the higher fuel price typically leads to a
fare increase. Electric utilities can reduce emissions by adjusting the
operations of generating units that use different fuels. That makes it
difficult to calculate the actual cost of a tax or ETS to a utility.49 During
the early phases of the EU ETS, provision of free allowances to electric
utilities led to higher electricity prices and large profits for utilities.50
To limit electricity price increases, California issues free allowances to
utilities but requires that they be sold at the quarterly auctions. The
revenue received is credited toward the cost of purchasing the
allowances needed for compliance when the regulator calculates
approved electricity prices.
In practice, then, the instrument designs are more complex than
the theoretical models with the result that it is sometimes difficult to
decide whether an instrument is a carbon tax or an ETS.51 For example,
RGGI has a minimum price, and at times between 2009 and 2013, the
auction price was equal to the minimum price with some allowances
not sold.52 During that time, the ETS was in effect a tax with the tax
rate equal to the minimum price. Switzerland implemented a carbon

market prices being uncertain. See generally id.
48. Easwaran Narassimhan et al., Carbon Pricing in Practice: A Review of Existing
Emissions Trading Systems, 18 CLIMATE POL’Y 967, 975–81 (2018).
49. WILLIAM ACWORTH ET AL., INT’L CARBON ACTION P’SHIP, EMISSIONS TRADING AND
ELECTRICITY SECTOR REGULATION 11 (2018).
50. SANDER DE BRUYN ET AL., CE DELFT, CALCULATION OF ADDITIONAL PROFITS OF
SECTORS AND FIRMS FROM THE EU ETS 8 (2016).
51. See Lachapelle, supra note 33, at 68 (“[T]he main difference between the two
instruments lies in setting the price versus quantity of emissions . . . Taxes are ‘price-based’
instruments, meaning that the price of carbon is fixed, and the quantity of emissions adjusts
according to decisions made by private actors in the market . . . Conversely, emissions trading is
‘quantity-based,’ meaning that the quantity of emissions is capped by the government.”).
52. JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RES. SERV., THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS
INITIATIVE: LESSONS LEARNED AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 10 (2017) (“Some of the offered
allowances were not sold and were subsequently retired.”).
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tax but allowed trading to achieve compliance. 53 The trading option
was widely used so the tax effectively served as the non-compliance
penalty for the trading system. 54 Consistent with other studies, this
paper treats both as ETSs: 55 RGGI because the floor price prevailed
only for a limited period, and Switzerland because the overwhelming
compliance option was trading.
III. EVALUATION CRITERIA
The main aim of this paper is to assess the performance of carbon
taxes and GHG ETSs as currently implemented. That requires
evaluation criteria. Drawing on criteria suggested by Goldblatt56 as the
basis for choosing between a tax and ETS for South Africa, the
following evaluation criteria are proposed:
Principal criteria: Environmental effectiveness (reduction of
actual emissions); Cost-effectiveness (low marginal abatement cost).
Secondary criteria: Economic efficiency (low price low volatility, price
signal commitment into the future to support investment decisions, and
harmonization of marginal costs across jurisdictions); Public finance
(revenue raised, and potential cross-jurisdiction revenue flows);
Administrative issues (institutional capacity, administrative costs,
difficulty of making adjustments to rules, and minimization of
corruption).

53. ENVTL. DEF. FUND ET AL., SWITZERLAND: AN EMISSIONS TRADING CASE STUDY 7
(2015) (“Firms covered by the levy had two choices: (1) pay the CO2 levy, or (2) voluntarily set a
verified absolute emissions target and associated allowance allocation and participate in the Swiss
ETS, which exempted them from the levy.”).
54. Id. at 6 (“[T]he penalty for companies that failed to achieve their Swiss ETS targets was
retroactive payment of the carbon levy (plus interest) for each ton of CO2 emitted since the
company’s exemption.”).
55. See, e.g., ICAP, supra note 26, at 52 (listing both RGGI and Switzerland as ETSs); see
also MÉTIVIER ET AL., supra note 27, at 3 (listing both RGGI and Switzerland as ETSs); WORLD
BANK, supra note 25, at 12 (listing RGGI as an ETS and Switzerland as having both an ETS and
a carbon tax and demonstrating that other studies also treat them as ETSs).
56. The Goldblatt criteria include the public policy criteria of economic efficiency,
environmental effectiveness, public finance considerations, welfare impacts, administrative
complexity, and relationship to global GHG reduction; they also include sub-criteria of price
volatility, impact on investment, certainty of results, coverage and exemptions, ability to monitor
and enforce, and ability to raise revenue cross-country revenue flows tax incidence and
interactions, distribution of costs and benefits across income groups, economic sectors and
generations, transparency of costs and benefits, institutional capacity costs of administration
minimization of corruption, level of emissions leakage, ability to harmonize global carbon pricing
efforts. Michael Goldblatt, Comparison of Emissions Trading and Carbon Taxation in South
Africa, 10 CLIMATE POL’Y 511, 516 (2010).
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A jurisdiction implementing a carbon tax or GHG ETS may also
be concerned about, inter alia, employment, income distribution,
regional impacts, economic growth, and technology development.
These are important issues that can be addressed through the design of
the instrument and use of the revenue generated. In our judgment,
these factors are not issues inherent to a tax or ETS so we do not use
them to assess the performance of the instruments.
A. Environmental effectiveness
Since the overriding purpose of a carbon tax or GHG ETS is to
reduce GHG emissions, the primary criterion is environmental
effectiveness.57 Environmental effectiveness has two dimensions—the
share of the jurisdiction’s GHG emissions covered by the instrument
and the net reduction in aggregate emissions covered by the
instrument.
All else equal, an instrument that covers a larger share of a
jurisdiction’s emissions should lead to larger emission reductions and
so be more effective. The share of the jurisdiction’s emissions covered
varies widely for existing carbon taxes and ETSs as shown in Table 1,
but the overall average is only slightly higher (48.1%) for ETSs than
taxes (45.5%). 58 Any difference in environmental effectiveness
therefore depends primarily on the reduction in the aggregate
emissions covered by the instruments.
Measuring emission reductions achieved by a carbon tax or ETS
and comparing reductions across jurisdictions raise several issues. A
tax or ETS has both price effects and revenue effects. As the cost of
emitting GHGs rises, consumers opt to purchase less GHG-intensive
goods and services. The revenue collected reduces income spent on
GHG-emitting activities, which lowers emissions, but how the revenue
is used could further raise or lower emissions. These price and revenue
effects impact not only the jurisdiction implementing the policy, but
also other jurisdictions with which it has direct or indirect economic
relationships.

57. Some jurisdictions may have implemented an instrument, more likely a tax than an ETS,
as a means of raising revenue. Ireland’s carbon tax, for example, was introduced to help meet
revenue raising and expenditure reduction targets established as conditions for international
financial support to help the country’s address its fiscal crisis. See Frank Convery, Louise Dunne
& Deirdre Joyce, Carbon Tax in the Context of the Fiscal Crisis, 8 CYPRUS ECON. POL’Y REV.
135, 135–36 (2014).
58. An ETS that allows the use of offset credits for compliance extends the price signal to
sources outside the cap that are eligible to generate credits.
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Since these instruments put a price on GHG emissions in the
implementing jurisdiction, the price effects are the key to their
performance. The first issue is whether to include the revenue effects
when assessing their performance. Our choice is to exclude the revenue
effects for conceptual and practical reasons. Conceptually, use of tax
revenue involves distinct policy choices not necessarily related to
emissions policy. While the proposed use of revenue may be important
in building support for a tax or ETS when it is introduced, actual use of
the revenue changes over time and varies widely across jurisdictions.
The practical reason is that there are several revenue effects that
are difficult to estimate and that have different impacts on emissions.
Revenue collected reduces spending on GHG-emitting goods and
services, thus lowering emissions. However, some of the revenue
redistributed to firms and households is spent on GHG-emitting goods
and services, thus raising emissions, whereas revenue used to fund
mitigation measures lowers emissions.59 As a result, the effect of those
expenditures would be double counted, both as lower emissions due to
the instrument and as funded reductions. The fact that these changes
in emissions are spread across multiple jurisdictions increases the
practical difficulties of trying to estimate the revenue effects.
Focusing on the emission reductions due to the price effects raises
the issue of the appropriate geographic scope. Our choice is to focus
on emission reductions in the implementing jurisdiction. Again, there
are conceptual and practical reasons for this choice. The conceptual
reason is that the instrument is implemented by a jurisdiction for the
purpose of reducing its emissions; thus, that is the relevant measure of
performance. However, the climate change impact depends on changes
to global emissions, which may be lower than the domestic reductions
due to inter-jurisdictional leakage.
The practical reason for focusing on domestic emission reductions
is that leakage is very difficult to estimate and is likely to be small in
practice. Implementation of a carbon pricing instrument can lead to
higher emissions by other sources via several different channels.60 Such
59. See Jeremy Carl & David Fedor, Tracking Global Carbon Revenues: A Survey of Carbon
Taxes Versus Cap-and-Trade in the Real World, 96 ENERGY POL’Y 50, 52–53 (2016). Revenue
collected in 2013 totaled USD 21.7 billion for taxes and USD 6.57 billion for ETSs. Id. at 51–52.
Redistributed shares were reported as tax cuts and rebates and were used to fund adaptation and
emission reduction measures. Id. at 65. The shares reported for the use of tax revenue do not sum
to 100. Id. at 52.
60. See Zengkai Zhang & Zhong Xiang Zhang, Intermediate Input Linkage and Carbon
Leakage 1, 3 n.1 (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Working Paper No. 062, 2016) (identifying the
competitiveness channel, fossil fuel channel, terms-of-trade effect, abatement resource effect,
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inter-source leakage is difficult to estimate.61 Ex ante model estimates
range from 5% to 20%, but the modelled instruments often lack the
specific provisions implemented to minimize leakage. Ex post
econometric studies for Europe find no evidence of leakage. 62
Instrument designs try to limit the leakage by reducing the economic
cost to EITE sources through exemptions, rebates, free allowances or
other measures.63
The challenge, then, is to measure the changes in domestic
emissions due to the price effects of the tax or ETS. The instrument
reduces emissions from what they would have been. Estimating what
emissions would have been and then calculating the reduction achieved
by the instrument is complex and speculative. Business-as-usual
emissions cannot be observed, only estimated. 64 Ex post estimates
based on actual levels of economic activity, weather, energy prices and
other factors affecting emissions are likely to be more accurate, but
they are still uncertain.65
We adopt a more practical, but more stringent, measure of
performance: the change in actual emissions subject to the instrument.
Data on actual emissions are verified for compliance purposes and are
reliable and publicly available for most of the ETSs. We have not found
a single jurisdiction that regularly tracks emissions subject to its carbon

technology channel, scale channel, and intertemporal channel).
61. See Brangar & Quirion, supra note 44, at 58 (“A recent comparative study of 12 different
models gave the most robust results so far. The estimate of leakage is 5-19% . . . .”); see also Bruce
Arnold, International Trade and Carbon Leakage 2 (Cong. Budget Office, Working Paper No.
2013-08, 2013) (stating that “[e]stimates of leakage . . . range from 1 percent to 23 percent”);
Zhong Xiang Zhang, Competitiveness and Leakage Concerns and Border Carbon Adjustments 9
(Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Working Paper No. 731, 2012) (citing “estimates of carbon
leakages . . . in the range of 5-20%”).
62. See Brangar & Quirion, supra note 44, at 60 (“The studies focusing on the EU ETS, the
largest carbon pricing experiment so far, have not revealed any evidence of carbon leakage . . .
.”).
63. See generally Justin Caron et al., Leakage from Sub-National Climate Policy: The Case
of California’s Cap-and-Trade Program, 36 ENERGY J. 25 (2015); see also Zhang, supra note 61,
19–21; Elisa Lanzi et al., Addressing Competitiveness and Carbon Leakage Impacts Arising from
Multiple Carbon Markets: A Modelling Assessment 27 (OECD Publ’g, Working Paper No. 58,
2013); EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 28, at 36.
64. See A. Denny Ellerman & Barbara K. Buchner, Over-Allocation or Abatement? A
Preliminary Analysis of the EU ETS Based on the 2005–06 Emissions Data 7 (Fondazione Eni
Enrico Mattei, Working Paper No. 139, 2006) (“Given uncertainty, the only way to overcome . . .
over- and under-allocation would be to adjust allowances ex post . . . .”).
65. Id. (“To the extent that economic activity, weather or any other factor affecting
emissions deviates from what is expected, counterfactual emissions will be higher or lower than
expected and any given cap will be more or less constraining with consequent effects on the
positions of all the components.”)
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tax. Our approach to estimating taxed emissions is discun Section IV.
Because reduction from what emissions would have been may not be
sufficient to lower actual emissions, requiring a reduction in actual
emissions is a more stringent criterion. We believe reduction of actual
emissions is an appropriate criterion given that most of the jurisdictions
that have implemented a tax or ETS have a GHG target expressed as
a reduction from a historic level.66
The use of external offset credits for compliance leads to higher
actual emissions and hence worse performance for some ETSs. This
applies only to ETSs, since none of the taxes being assessed allows the
use of offsets for compliance.67 Actual emissions are not adjusted for
the use of external offset credits because they were used mainly
between 2011 and 2014, with negligible use during earlier and later
years.68 This means they have negligible impact on the actual emissions
during the years used to calculate the rates of change in emissions.69 If
there is an impact, it is to make our standard slightly more stringent.
In summary, the environmental performance of an instrument is
measured as the change in actual emissions by sources subject to the
instrument. Emissions changes due to the collection and use of the
revenue are excluded. Emissions changes due to the use of offsets and
leakage are likewise excluded. This is a more stringent measure of
66. For example, British Columbia has a target of a 33% reduction from 2007 emissions by
2020, and Quebec has a target of a 20% reduction from 1990 GHG levels by 2020. See CARBON
DISCLOSURE PROJECT (“CDP”), GLOBAL STATES AND REGIONS ANNUAL DISCLOSURE, 2017
UPDATE 5–6 (2017). The EU target is a 14% reduction from 2005 emissions by 2020 with the ETS
achieving a 21% reduction and non-ETS sectors a 10% reduction. See EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra
note 28, at 12. Tokyo has a target of a 25% reduction from 2000 GHG levels by 2020, and RGGI
states have a regional target of a more than 50% reduction of CO2 emissions from electricity
generation from 2005 levels by 2020. See Japan Tokyo Cap-and Trade Program and USA –
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) Factsheets, ICAP, https://icapcarbonaction.com/
en/ets-map?etsid=50. The reduction target for the tax or ETS may differ from the overall target
for the jurisdiction but since these instruments cover about half of the jurisdiction’s total emissions
on average, an overall target that requires a reduction in actual emissions likely requires a
reduction in emissions subject to the instrument as well.
67. But see CLIMATE ACTION RESERVE, INTRODUCTION TO CARBON MARKETS IN
MEXICO 3 (2015). The Mexican carbon tax legislation allows entities to use CERs generated by
CDM projects in Mexico to reduce their overall tax bill by an amount equivalent to the market
value of the CERs at the time the tax is paid. Id. It appears that these rules and valuation criteria
have yet to be fully developed. Id.
68. Haites, supra note 37, at 252–54.
69. See RANDALL SPALDING-FECHER ET AL., CDM POLICY DIALOGUE, ASSESSING THE
IMPACT OF THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM 37 (2012) (concluding that “[t]he CDM [an
offset credit] in its current form has negligible sustainable development benefits”); see also Peter
Erickson et al., Net Climate Change Mitigation of the Clean Development Mechanism, 72 ENERGY
POL’Y 147 (2014) (stating that an assessment of the performance of the instruments on a global
basis would need to address the additionality of the offset credits).
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performance than a reduction from what emissions would have been,
but it is consistent with the targets of most of the jurisdictions that
implemented the instruments and relies upon on much higher quality
data.
The performance of instruments that cover different quantities of
emissions and that have been in effect for different periods of time is
compared on the basis of the compound annual rate of change of actual
emissions. The use of the annual rate of change also enables
instruments whose data are reported for fiscal years to be compared
with those that report on a calendar year basis. The use of data on
actual emissions means that the base for calculating the annual rate of
change is the actual emissions for the first year or first compliance
period the instrument was in effect and, consequently, that any
reductions achieved during the first year or period are excluded. 70
Again, this yields a conservative estimate of performance.
B. Cost effectiveness
Cost effectiveness focuses on achieving the emission reduction
target at minimum cost. Minimizing the cost of reducing GHG
emissions benefits society by freeing up resources for other priorities.
Indeed, the main motivation for implementing carbon taxes and GHG
ETSs is that they can reduce emissions at lower cost to society than
other forms of regulation.71
The marginal abatement cost for an emitter is the tax rate (USD
/tCO2e), in the case of a carbon tax, and the price of an allowance, in
the case of an ETS.72 The tax rate is set by the government, while the
allowance price is determined by the market. Jurisdictions set the tax
rate to achieve an emissions reduction target, meet a revenue target,
reflect the social cost of CO2 emissions, or match compliance costs in
other jurisdictions.73 The allowance price reflects the emissions target
and other provisions of the ETS design.
In practice, both tax rates and allowance prices span wide ranges.
As shown in Table 1, tax rates range from less than USD 1/tCO2e to
USD 140/tCO2e, while ETS prices range from less than USD 1/tCO2e

70. The Japanese carbon tax and Irish solid fuel carbon tax took effect mid-year. The actual
emissions for the first full year are used as the base of the calculation of rate of emission reduction.
71. Pollitt, supra note 1, at 3; Baranzini et al., supra note 2, at 3–6.
72. Pollitt, supra note 1, at 7–8.
73. WORLD BANK P’SHIP FOR MARKET READINESS, supra note 1, at 26 (“Carbon taxes can
also be designed to generate a number of . . . important benefits, such as raising revenue,
internalizing the social costs of emissions, and increasing the efficiency of the tax system.”).
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to USD 24/tCO2e. In 2017 the average tax rate (USD 13.04) was over
65% higher than the average ETS allowance price (USD 7.79).
Some analyses compare tax rates and allowance prices to
estimates of the economic value of a one tCO2e emission reduction (the
social cost of carbon) over time.74 This cost-benefit test is difficult to
implement due to the wide range of the estimated values of the social
cost of carbon.75 In addition, using the social cost of carbon may be
inappropriate because it incorporates numerous impacts of GHG
emissions that are very difficult to estimate and applies a marginal
value to a non-marginal situation, the need to completely eliminate
anthropogenic
GHG
emissions
to
stabilize
atmospheric
concentrations.76
Since most of the jurisdictions that have implemented a carbon tax
or GHG ETS have a target that requires a reduction of actual
emissions, the cost-effectiveness goal of achieving that target at the
lowest cost is more appropriate than the cost-benefit test that compares
the tax rate or allowance price with the social cost of carbon. Even if a
specific value of the social cost of carbon could be agreed upon, the
emission reduction that would be achieved with a tax rate or allowance
price equal to that value is not known for most jurisdictions and is
unlikely to coincide with its established target.
C. Economic efficiency
Economic efficiency has several dimensions in addition to cost
effectiveness, including price stability, a credible price signal, and
harmonization across jurisdictions. 77 The vast majority of mitigation
74. See Lawrence H. Goulder et al., China’s National Carbon Dioxide Emission Trading
System: An Introduction, 6 ECON. ENERGY & ENVTL. POL’Y 1, 11–12 (2017) (“The social cost of
carbon (SCC) represents the marginal climate benefit, and in a well-functioning ETS the
allowance price indicates marginal abatement costs.”).
75. See, e.g., William D. Nordhaus, Revisiting the Social Cost of Carbon, 114 PROCEEDINGS
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 1518, 1520–21 (2017); NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW 62 (2006); Stephen Smith & Nils Axel Braathen, Monetary Carbon
Values in Policy Appraisal: An Overview of Current Practice and Key Issues 10–15 (OECD Publ’g,
Working Paper No. 92, 2015) (discussing how estimating the social cost of carbon is very complex
and the results are very sensitive to the discount rate used, with several authors discussing
methodological issues and values used by different countries); Maximilian Auffhammer,
Quantifying Economic Damages from Climate Change, 32 J. ECON. PERSPS. 33 (2018) (describing
the multiple approaches to estimating the social cost of carbon).
76. See Morgan et al., Rethinking the Social Cost of Carbon Dioxide, 33 ISSUES IN SCI. &
TECH. 4 (2017) (asserting that “false precision from IAMs is being used in the generation of
quantitative ‘answers’ that have come to serve as an inappropriate foundation for public
policies”).
77. See WORLD BANK CARBON PRICING LEADERSHIP COAL., REPORT OF THE HIGH-

3. Haites Final Word Doc Original Spacing (Do Not Delete)

Fall 2018]

CARBON TAXES & EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEMS

1/4/2019 4:34 PM

129

actions involve capital investments; price stability and a credible price
signal facilitate those investment decisions. Harmonization across
jurisdictions improves global economic efficiency. An ETS is
countercyclical—during a recession output declines, emissions fall,
allowance prices drop, and compliance costs are reduced with the
opposite effects during an economic boom—while the tax rate remains
constant or rises.78
Price stability (low volatility) allows market participants to better
evaluate potential mitigation options. 79 A tax is more stable than
allowance prices, but changes to the tax rate tend to be unpredictable.80
Many ETSs include provisions to enhance price stability such as sale of
additional allowances when the price is high, access to offset credits,
and a minimum price. Larger ETSs tend to have options and futures
contracts that enable sources to obtain allowances at an agreed price
at a future date, thus reducing price uncertainty.81 Comparable options
and contracts do not exist for taxes.
A commitment that signals future prices also facilitates mitigation
investment decisions.82 The price signal should cover a period during
which most investments are repaid—at least five years into the future.
When a new carbon tax is implemented, annual or biannual tax rate
increases are often announced three to five years into the future.83 The
frequency of tax rate changes varies widely across jurisdictions, but
across all the taxes analyzed, about 40% of the years have no increase
LEVEL COMMISSION ON CARBON PRICES 21–24 (2017) (discussing characteristics of “dynamic
and adaptive climate policy designs,” including the efficiency of carbon-price signals and
international cooperation).
78. See Pollitt, supra note 1, at 11 (contrasting carbon trading schemes with “[f]ixed tax rates
[which] become more burdensome and hence difficult to defend in times of recession”).
79. If future allowance or credit prices are uncertain, the value of future emission reductions
is uncertain. Greater price volatility means greater uncertainty. Greater uncertainty favors
investments with shorter payback periods.
80. See infra Section IV.C. For a discussion of the possible mechanisms to reduce the
political uncertainty associated with taxes, see WORLD BANK P’SHIP FOR MARKET READINESS,
supra note 1, at chs.6, 7.
81. See EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 28, at 71 (describing futures and options trades).
The ICE exchange, for example, offers Futures Options for the allowances of the EU ETS
(EUAs). See EUA Futures Options Contract, INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE,
https://www.theice.com/products/196/EUA-Futures-Options (last visited Oct. 25, 2018).
82. See Dijkgraaf et al., On the Effectiveness of Feed-In Tariffs in the Development of Solar
Photovoltaics, 39 ENERGY J. 81, 94 (2018) (finding in their analysis of the effectiveness of feed-intariffs for solar photovoltaics in Europe that the maximum effect can be as much as seven times
larger with a high tariff and a long contract duration in combination with a consistent policy).
83. See generally WORLD BANK P’SHIP FOR MARKET READINESS, supra note 1, at apps.
(showing that upon introduction, tax rates were specified for three years by France and the UK
and for five years by British Columbia and Japan).

3. Haites Final Word Doc Original Spacing (Do Not Delete)

1/4/2019 4:34 PM

130

[Vol. XXIX:109

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

in the tax rate.84 Practices relating to changes in tax rates are discussed
further in Section IV.C. ETSs tend to have longer (five to eight years)
and stronger commitments (regulations and legislation) to future caps
and price stability provisions.85
Global economic efficiency is improved if all sources in all
jurisdictions face the same marginal abatement cost. In principle,
carbon taxes can be harmonized across jurisdictions, but international
coordination of a tax is very complex and has never been attempted.86
Linking ETSs to allow participants to use allowances from any of the
linked ETS for compliance could narrow allowance price differences.
Such linking is common, but current ETSs limit the quantity of
imported allowances. Thus, the price differences across ETSs are
narrowed but not eliminated and the potential savings are only
partially realized.87
D. Public finance
Both taxes and ETSs (auctioned allowances) raise revenue. The
revenue can be used for a mix of economic stimulus (reduce existing
distortionary taxes), equity (fair distribution of the costs of reducing
GHG emissions), environmental goals (funding GHG reductions or
adaptation measures), and other purposes. Although we exclude the
emissions impacts of revenue collection and use, the amount of
revenue collected and its use for economic and environmental
purposes can be an important consideration in building and sustaining
support for a carbon tax or GHG ETS.
Carbon taxes tend to raise more revenue than ETSs for two
reasons. A carbon tax imposes the tax on all designated emissions,
while many ETSs distribute some allowances for free. Furthermore, tax

84. Analysis of the tax rate data in infra Annex I shows that in 42% of the years the tax rate
was the same as the previous year.
85. See generally Jessika Luth Richter & Lizzie Chambers, Reflections and Outlook for the
New Zealand ETS, 10 POL’Y Q. 57 (2014) (concluding that regulatory uncertainty meant there
was no incentive to invest in mitigation actions thus contributing to the ineffectiveness of the New
Zealand ETS).
86. It is the effective tax that must be harmonized. In addition to the carbon tax, the effective
tax also depends on other taxes such as fuel taxes, Value Added Tax (VAT), and sales taxes on
energy, so the burden of all of those taxes on each category of emitters needs to be harmonized.
Then there are practical issues of harmonizing taxes denominated in different currencies and
coordinating implementation of tax changes across jurisdictions. See Pollitt, supra note 1, at 10.
87. RGGI consists of nine linked state systems but they use a common allowance, so there
are no restrictions on transfers among states. Similarly, California and Quebec use allowances
that are indistinguishable to users with no restrictions on interjurisdictional transfers. Haites,
supra note 37, at 257.
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rates tend to be higher than allowance prices, thereby raising more
revenue. In 2013, carbon taxes collected USD 21.7 billion in revenue
while ETSs generated USD 6.57 billion.88 By 2017, the total revenue
had increased to USD 32 billion: USD 21 billion from taxes and USD
11 billion by ETSs.89
In practice, the revenue collected from carbon taxes and ETSs is
used differently. In 2013, 70% of the ETS revenue was used to
subsidize “green” spending on energy efficiency, renewable energy,
and adaptation measures; 21% went to general revenue; and 9% was
used to fund corporate and individual tax cuts or direct rebates.90 In the
case of carbon taxes, 15% of the revenue was used to support green
spending, 28% went to general revenue and 44% was used for tax cuts
and rebates.91 These percentages vary widely across jurisdictions for
both taxes and ETSs.
A considerable body of literature is devoted to the potential
economic benefits of revenue recycling—using carbon tax or ETS
auction revenue to reduce existing distortionary taxes.92 Based on the
2013 data, as much as 85% of the tax revenue and up to 30% of the
ETS revenue might be used to reduce existing distortionary taxes.
These figures combine the percentages of revenue that went to general
revenue (and so could offset revenue lost due to cuts in other taxes)
and to tax cuts and rebates.
Many of the national jurisdictions that have implemented a carbon
tax and a GHG ETS were parties to the Kyoto Protocol for the 2008–
12 commitment period,93 including the members of the EU ETS, Japan,
88. Carl & Fedor, supra note 59, at 52–53.
89. CLÉMENT MÉTIVIER ET AL., INST. FOR CLIMATE ECON., Global Carbon Account 2018
1, 4 (2018), https://www.i4ce.org/publications-2/; see also Smith & Braathen, supra note 75, at 10–
16.
90. Carl & Fedor, supra note 59, at 52–53.
91. Id. at 53. Rebates are more likely to go to entities subject to the tax, such as EITE firms,
while tax cuts are more likely to go to individuals adversely affected by the carbon tax. The
percentages for the use of carbon tax revenue do not sum to 100. If the shares are recalculated to
sum to 100, they are 17% green spending, 32% general revenue, and 51% tax cuts and rebates.
92. See Cameron Hepburn, Regulation by Prices, Quantities or Both: A Review of Instrument
Choice, 22 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 226, 236–37 (2006) (reviewing the literature on the
economic benefits of revenue recycling).
93. The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
which entered into force in 2005, committed parties listed in Annex B (developed countries and
countries with economies in transition) to limit their 2008–12 greenhouse gas emissions. It
established three international emissions trading mechanisms that the parties could use to help
them meet their commitments—the clean development mechanism (CDM, article 12), joint
implementation (JI, article 6), and international emissions trading (IET, article 17). The CDM
enabled approved emission projects in developing countries to earn credits (CERs) that could be
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New Zealand, and Switzerland. The Kyoto Protocol established three
international
market
mechanisms—the
clean
development
mechanism, joint implementation, and international emissions trading.
The units traded using these mechanisms—CERs, ERUs, and AAUs
respectively—were accepted, with some qualitative and quantitative
restrictions, for compliance by the national ETSs of these countries.94
CER purchases by ETS participants helped fund emission reduction
measures in developing countries.95
All international climate agreements have called, and continue to
call, for resource transfers from developed to developing countries.96
With an ETS such transfers can occur via trade in allowances and offset
credits as well as through government budgets. With a carbon tax
international resource transfers must flow through government
budgets.
E. Administrative issues
An ETS requires a more complex and costlier administrative
structure than a carbon tax. Although most jurisdictions already collect
taxes on fossil fuels, adding a carbon tax may involve changes to the
monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) system and to
compliance enforcement. The administrative complexity and cost rise
if the scope of the carbon tax extends beyond fossil fuels already taxed.
An ETS, on the other hand, creates new administrative
requirements including: an MRV system; institutions to distribute
allowances, enforce compliance, and monitor the allowance market;
and a computer registry to track allowance holdings. Jurisdictions that
have implemented an ETS, such as the EU and California, have offered

sold to Annex B parties. JI and IET enabled credits (ERUs) and allowances (AAUs) respectively
to be traded among Annex B parties. In 2012, the Doha amendment to the Kyoto Protocol that
specifies 2013–20 commitments for Annex B parties was adopted. The Amendment has not yet
entered into force. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998); What is the Kyoto
Protocol?, UN FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, https://unfccc.int/processand-meetings/the-kyoto-protocol/what-is-the-kyoto-protocol (last visited Nov. 3, 2018).
94. Haites, supra note 37, at 251–55.
95. See CDM Pipeline Overview, UNEP DTU PARTNERSHIP, www.cdmpipeline.org (last
visited Oct. 4, 2018) (showing that the clean development mechanism, the largest of the three
trading mechanisms, involved over 7,500 in projects in more than 95 developing countries).
96. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) arts. 4.3, 4.4.
and 11, 31 I.L.M. 849, May 9, 1991; Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change art. 11, Conference of the Parties, 3d Sess., Dec. 10, 1997, UN Doc
FCCC/CP.1997/L.7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22; Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change art. 9, Apr. 22, 2016.

3. Haites Final Word Doc Original Spacing (Do Not Delete)

Fall 2018]

1/4/2019 4:34 PM

CARBON TAXES & EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEMS

133

support relating to instrument design and development of institutional
capacity to other jurisdictions.
Implementation of a carbon tax or ETS usually requires specific
legislation and regulations. Once implemented, changes to the tax rate
or coverage often can be made as part of a budget. Changes to the rules
governing an ETS tend to require changes to regulations and
legislation, which usually involves a process of notice and consultation.
In the case of multi-jurisdiction ETSs, such as the EU ETS and RGGI,
changes can take several years to implement. No attempt has yet been
made to implement a carbon tax that is harmonized across multiple
jurisdictions.
We are not aware of data on the cost of implementing and
administering an ETS or a carbon tax. 97 The administrative costs of
environmental taxes, rather than carbon taxes specifically, are reported
to be low. 98 Data on tax avoidance for carbon taxes and various
possible forms of corruption for ETSs also are very scarce. Sweden
reports a carbon tax evasion rate of 1% and the UK estimates an
energy tax evasion rate of about 2%.99
IV. REDUCTIONS IN EMISSIONS SUBJECT TO CARBON TAXES
This section assesses the GHG emissions changes in jurisdictions
that have implemented carbon taxes, reviews other assessments of the
performance of the British Columbia and early European carbon taxes,
compares changes in non-ETS and taxed emissions for European
carbon taxes since 2008, and reviews factors that limit the performance
of carbon taxes.
A. Changes in emissions subject to carbon taxes
To assess the impact of a carbon tax on the emissions by sources
subject to the tax, we need data on taxed emissions. We did not find a
single jurisdiction that regularly reports the emissions subject to any of
its carbon taxes.100 The absence of such data probably reflects the fact
97. See JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE:
LESSONS LEARNED AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 12 (Cong. Res. Serv. 2017) (reporting that that
5% of RGGI’s auction revenue is used for administration and RGGI Inc. which manages the
system).
98. See EUROPEAN ENV’T AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION AND EU
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES 16 (2016), https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/environmentaltaxation-and-eu-environmental-policies (reporting administrative costs for German and UK
environmental taxes at less than 0.5%).
99. See id. (showing that both rates are much lower than the evasion rates for other taxes).
100. See infra Annex I (Denmark, Ireland and Slovenia have two carbon taxes while Norway
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that governments are interested primarily in collecting the taxes due
and therefore do not require the taxpayers to report the associated
CO2e emissions. Governments could, of course, easily calculate the
CO2e emissions from the data provided.
We estimate the emissions covered by a carbon tax by dividing the
carbon tax revenue collected by the tax rate per tCO2e. That requires
data on the carbon tax revenue collected and the tax rate which,
fortunately, are available for many jurisdictions. We were not able to
collect the requisite data for Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Mexico, Poland,
or Portugal. We were not able to collect the required data for a few
years after implementation of the carbon taxes in Denmark, Norway,
Slovenia, and Sweden either. The data on tax revenue, tax rate, and
estimated taxed emissions by jurisdiction and tax are presented in
Annex 1.
As discussed in section III.A, this calculation estimates actual
emissions subject to the carbon tax with no adjustments for leakage or
emission changes due to use of the tax revenue. Ireland has different
carbon taxes for two groups of fossil fuels. Denmark and Slovenia each
have two carbon taxes—on specified CO2 emissions and on sales of
fluorinated gases—while Norway also taxes emissions by offshore oil
and gas activities for a total of three. Since some carbon taxes apply
discounted tax rates to emissions by specified sources, the calculation
tends to understate the emissions subject to the carbon tax somewhat.
However, focusing on the annual rates of change and using the
estimated emissions during the first year as the base minimizes the
effect of such underestimation.
We ignore small changes in the coverage of the tax. For example,
British Columbia offered a one-time exemption (worth CAD 7.6
million) from the carbon tax for greenhouse operators in 2012.101 The
2013 budget changed this to an ongoing 80% reduction of the tax for
greenhouse operators.102 Gasoline and diesel used for agriculture were
exempted from the carbon tax by the 2014 budget. 103 For different
has three).
101. At the tax rate of CAD 30/tCO2, the exemption represented about 0.25 MtCO2, about
0.67% of the emissions covered by the tax. Information on the magnitude of the agricultural fuel
exemption is not available, but the changes in the annual emissions suggest that it is small as well.
See Brian Murray & Nicholas Rivers, British Columbia’s Revenue-Neutral Carbon Tax: A Review
of the Latest “Grand Experiment” 4–5 (Nicholas Inst., Working Paper No. 15–04, 2015),
http://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/publications (listing exemptions).
102. B.C. MINISTRY OF FINANCE, BUDGET AND FISCAL PLAN, 2013/14–2015/16 60 (2013),
https://www.bcbudget.gov.bc.ca/2013/bfp/2013_Budget_Fiscal_Plan.pdf.
103. NICHOLAS RIVERS & BRANDON SCHAUFELE, PAC. INST. CLIMATE SOLS., THE EFFECT
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jurisdictions, the data relate to calendar or fiscal years. Comparisons of
annual rates of change are valid across jurisdictions with different fiscal
years.
We were able to estimate taxed emissions for 17 carbon taxes in
12 jurisdictions. Table 2 compares our estimates of the 2016 taxed
emissions by all of a jurisdiction’s carbon taxes as a share of its total
GHG emissions, excluding land use, land use change, and forestry
(LULUCF) emissions, with those from Métivier et al. reported in
Table 1. Since Métivier et al. was published early in 2017, the shares it
reports probably relate to 2015 or 2016, but the data and the
methodology used to calculate the shares reported are not specified.
Thus, it is not possible to explain the reasons for differences between
our estimated shares and those reported by Métivier et al.
Table 2. Taxed Emissions as a Share of Total GHG Emissions

Jurisdiction

Estimates
from Table
1
60%
42%
45%
24%

Estimates from tax
revenue and tax rate for
2016
58%
40%
44%
44%

Norway
Sweden
Denmark
Slovenia
British
70%
68%
Columbia
Liechtenstein
26%
28%
Switzerland
35%
26%
Ireland
33%
30%
Iceland
55%
62%
Japan
70%
65%
UK
25%
12%
France
40%
39%
Sources: Table 1 and estimates of taxed emissions from
Annex 1 divided by total GHG emissions excluding
LULUCF.

OF BRITISH COLUMBIA’S CARBON TAX ON AGRICULTURAL TRADE 6 (2014) (stating that
farmers were exempted from the carbon tax on the purchase of colored gasoline and colored
diesel fuel for farm use effective January 1, 2014).
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The two estimates are surprisingly close except for Iceland,
Slovenia, Switzerland, and the UK. In the case of the UK, the reason
may be the rapid decline in emissions by coal-fired generating units
subject to the carbon price floor: using our 2015 data yields a share of
23% rather than 12%. Our estimates of taxed emissions also yield
reasonable shares of total GHG emissions and of non-ETS emissions,
where applicable, over time. In short, we feel our estimates of taxed
emissions are reasonable and suitable for assessing the performance of
the carbon taxes.
The annual rate of change of taxed emissions for each of the 17
carbon taxes for which we have data is shown in Table 3. Only six of
the 17 taxes have reduced actual emissions—Denmark (duty on CO2),
Japan, Slovenia (fluorinated gases), Sweden, Switzerland and the UK.
The rates of change of taxed emissions vary widely, from a reduction
of over 42% per year for the UK carbon price floor to an increase of
more than 24% per year for fluorinated gases in Denmark.
Table 3. Annual Rate of Change of Taxed Emissions by Carbon
Tax
Annual rate of
Time
change of taxed
Jurisdiction/tax
period
emissions (%)
Norway
1994–
Tax on CO2 emissions
2.10
2016
Tax on offshore CO2
1999–
5.22
emissions
2016
2003–
Tax on fluorinated gases
3.46
2016
1993–
-1.91
Sweden
2016
Denmark
1994–
Duty on CO2 emissions
-2.31
2016
2013–
Tax on fluorinated gases
24.08
2016
Slovenia
1999–
1.24
Tax on CO2 emissions
2016
2010–
-11.23
Tax on fluorinated gases
2016
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Jurisdiction/tax
British Columbia
Switzerland
Liechtenstein
Ireland
Natural gas and liquids
carbon tax

Time
period

137

Annual rate of
change of taxed
emissions (%)

2008–
2016
2008–
2016
2009–
2016

2011–
2016
2015–
Solid fuel carbon tax
2016
2011–
Iceland
2015
2013–
Japan
2016
2014–
UK
2016
2015–
France
2016
Source: Calculated from emissions data in Annex 1

3.62
-4.50
2.12

1.41
14.93
2.91
-3.29
-42.54
5.45

An increase in emissions after implementation of the carbon tax
does not mean the tax had no impact; only that the tax was not
sufficient to reverse a trend of rising emissions. The studies reviewed
in the next section assess taxes in terms of their impact on business-asusual emissions. As noted earlier, we believe our criterion of a
reduction in actual emissions is more appropriate given the GHG
targets of the jurisdictions that have implemented the taxes.
B. Other assessments of the performance of carbon taxes
This section summarizes other studies that have assessed the
performance of carbon taxes. Those studies fall into two groups:
estimates of the impact of British Columbia’s carbon tax and
assessments of the carbon taxes implemented by European countries
prior to 2008.
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1. Estimates of the impact of British Columbia’s carbon tax
British Columbia’s carbon tax went into effect on July 1, 2008 at
CAD 10/tCO2. The tax increased at a rate of CAD 5/tCO2 per year to
CAD 30/tCO2 per year on July 1, 2012. 104 The tax rate remained at
CAD 30/tCO2 for the next five years.105 Six published estimates of the
impact of the tax are summarized in Table 4. All are limited to the
period when the tax rate was rising annually. Four of the estimates
focus on per capita or per household gasoline consumption, which
accounts for about a quarter of the taxed emissions. The results
reported suggest that the tax reduced emissions by 5% to 15% from
what they would have been.106
In Table 4 the published estimates are adjusted, where
appropriate, for population growth and then expressed as an annual
change in total emissions. With one exception, the estimated impacts
are equivalent to an annual reduction of business-as-usual emissions of
less than 2%, so actual emissions could increase despite the impact of
the tax.
Although it is not evident from the data in Table 4, Erutku and
Hildebrand find that the impact began to diminish after the tax rate
was frozen. 107 Lawley and Thiverge find that the urban households
reduced gasoline consumption more than rural households because
they have more transportation options.108 Both results are consistent
with the expected responses to a carbon tax.
In summary, all studies have found that the carbon tax reduced
the emissions an analyzed relative to business-as-usual while the tax
rate was rising. Our data indicate that taxed emissions increased both
during the initial five years as the tax rate rose and during the
subsequent five years when the tax rate remained constant. These
results are not inconsistent. Rather, they indicate that our criterion, as
stated earlier, is more stringent.

104. Eduardo Porter, Does a Carbon Tax Work? Ask British Columbia, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/02/business/does-a-carbon-tax-work-ask-britishcolumbia.html.
105. Id.
106. See generally Murray & Rivers, supra note 101 (drawing this conclusion based on a range
of different studies).
107. See Can Erutku & Vincent Hildebrand, Carbon Tax at the Pump in British Columbia
and Quebec, 44 CAN. PUB. POL’Y 126, 131 (2018) (“[G]asoline consumption per capita in British
Columbia started to increase after April 2012 (it had been on a declining trend since 2004) as the
carbon tax peaked on and remained constant after July 2012[.]”).
108. Chad Lawley & Vincent Thivierge, Refining the Evidence: British Columbia’s Carbon
Tax and Household Gasoline Consumption, 39 ENERGY J. 147, 168 (2018).
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Table 4. Estimates of the Impact of British Columbia’s Carbon
Tax on Taxed Emissions
Change in
Change in
Change
Total
Study
Methodology Years per capita
in TE per
Emissions
Emissions
Year
(TE)
Trend in per
capita
consumption
of taxed fuels
relative to the
4
-18.8%
-13.65%
-3.41%
rest of Canada
from 2007–
Elgie
2008 to 2011–
and
McClay 2012
109
Trend in per
capita GHG
emissions
subject to the
3
-8.9%
-5.28%
-1.76%
tax relative to
the rest of
Canada from
2008 to 2011
Simulation
using static
computable
general EQ
model of the
Beck et Canadian
5
-9.14%
-1.83%
al.110
economy
calibrated to
provincial
production and
consumption
patterns.

109. Stewart Elgie & Jessica McClay, BC’s Carbon Tax Shift Is Working Well After Four
Years (Attention Ottawa), 39 CAN. PUB. POL’Y 1, 1–6 (2013).
110. Marisa Beck et al., Carbon Tax and Revenue Recycling: Impacts on Households in British
Columbia, 41 RESOURCE & ENERGY ECON. 40, 54 (2015).
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Methodology

Difference-indifference
estimate of per
Rivers capita gasoline
use in British
and
Schauf Columbia
relative to rest
ele111
of Canada
from 1990
through 2011
Difference-indifference
estimate of
household
Lawley
gasoline
and
spending in
ThiviBritish
erge112
Columbia
relative to rest
of Canada for
2001–2012
Difference-indifference
estimate of per
Erutku
capita gasoline
and
use in British
HildeColumbia
brand
relative to rest
113
of Canada
from 1991
through 2015

Change in
Change in
Change
Total
Years per capita
in TE per
Emissions
Emissions
Year
(TE)

4

-8.40%

-3.70%

-0.93%

5

-6.67% to
-10.67%

-1.13% to
-4.87%

<-0.97%

5

-5.8% to 16.4%

-0.26% to
-10.3%

≤-2.0%

111. Nicholas Rivers & Brandon Schaufele, Salience of Carbon Taxes in the Gasoline Market,
74 J. ENVTL. ECON. MGMT. 23–36 (2015).
112. See Lawley & Thivierge, supra note 108, at 168 (applying the carbon tax of 6.67 c/liter to
the lower bound estimate of tax semi-elasticity of -0.010 and the baseline estimate of -0.016 yields
per capita emission reduction estimates of -6.67% and -10.67% respectively over 5 years).
113. See generally Erutku & Hildebrand, supra note 107, at 128.
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Note that in Table 4, impact on total emissions is calculated as the
change in emissions divided by the population growth over the period.
For example, the -18.8% change in emissions is partially offset by
4.53% population growth, so the impact on total emissions is calculated
as 1.188/1.0453 = 1.1365 or a 13.65% reduction in total emissions.
2. Estimates of the impact of European carbon taxes prior to
2008
European countries that implemented carbon taxes prior to 2008
include Denmark; Estonia; Finland; Norway; Poland; Slovenia;
Sweden and, for limited periods, Italy and the Netherlands. Some
analysts treat the UK’s Fossil Fuel Levy and Climate Change Levy,
which were implemented during this period, as carbon taxes, though
the tax rates were not related to the GHG emissions produced by the
fuels. We found estimates of the emissions reductions achieved by the
taxes in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden as well as multicountries that also cover Austria, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and the
UK. The findings of those studies are summarized in Table 5. Some of
the national studies estimate reductions only for part of the emissions
covered by the tax, such as transport or industrial emissions.
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Table 5. Estimates of the Impact of European Carbon Taxes on
Taxed Emissions
Carbon Tax Time
Reduction
Emission Reductions
Jurisdiction Period
per Year
Energy taxes reduced 1997 BAU
Denmark
energy use by industry by 10%
Bjørner and 1992–
based on comparison of firms
2%
1997
Jensen,
that paid full and reduced tax
2002114
rates.
Danish CO2 emissions adjusted
1990–
for weather and electricity
<1%
1996
Denmark
exports fell by some 4%.
Andersen,
Danish CO2 emissions adjusted
et al, 2000115 1990–
for weather and electricity
1%
1998
exports fell by some 8%.
Finland
With no change to the 1990
Economic
1990– energy taxes, Finnish CO2
<1%
Council,
1998 emissions would have been 7%
116
higher in 1998.
2000
CO2 emissions due to oil
Norway
combustion for stationary use by
Larsen and
1991–
households and industry and
Nesbakken
1993
<2%
household transport declined by
1997117
3-4%.

114. Thomas Bue Bjørner & Henrik Holm Jensen, Energy Taxes, Voluntary Agreements and
Investment Subsidies—A Micro-Panel Analysis of the Effect on Danish Industrial Companies’
Energy Demand, 24 RESOURCE ENERGY ECON. 229, 243 (2002).
115. Mikael Skou Andersen et al., An Evaluation of the Impact of Green Taxes in the Nordic
Countries, TemaNord 2000:561, 13.
116. Prime Minister’s Economic Council, Environmental and Energy Taxation in Finland—
Preparing for the Kyoto Challenge: Summary of the Working Group Report, Prime Minister’s
Office Publ’n Series 4/2000, 41–42.
117. Bodil Merethe Larsen & Runa Nesbakken, Norwegian Emissions of CO2 1987–1994, 9
ENVTL. RESOURCE ECON. (1997) 287, § 5, 14. The emissions analyzed accounted for between
35% and 41% of taxable emissions during the period.
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Carbon Tax
Jurisdiction

Time
Period

Norway
Bruvoll and
Larsen,
2004118

1990–
1999

Sweden
Andersen et
al., 2000119

1991–
1994

Sweden
Bohlin,
1998120

1991–
1995

Sweden
Andersson,
2017121

1990–
2005

Denmark,
Finland,
Netherlands,
Norway,
Sweden
Lin and Li,
2011122

Inception to
2008

Emission Reductions
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Reduction
per Year

An applied general equilibrium
simulation of the effects of
carbon taxes finds that they
<1%
reduced CO2 emissions by
2.3% over the period.
Model estimate finds 1994 CO2
emissions 3-5% lower than
About 1%
with continuation of 1990
taxes.
Overall reduction in CO2
1.5 to
emissions of 1.5 to 4.5% per
4.5%
year due to the tax.
The tax resulted a 6.3%
reduction in per capita CO2
3.6%
transport emissions in an
average year.
Significant negative impact on
the growth of per capita CO2
emissions in Finland. Negative,
but not significant, impact on
per capita CO2 emissions in
Denmark, Sweden and
Netherlands. Insignificant
positive impact in Norway.

Austria,
Denmark,
Finland, Italy,
Netherlands,
Carbon taxes led to statistically
Sweden and
Incep- significant reductions in CO2
UK
tion to emissions only for Sweden and
Mideksa and
2008 the UK (the Climate Change
Kallbekken,
Levy).
undated123

118. Annegrete Bruvoll & Bodil Merethe Larsen, Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Norway Do Carbon Taxes Work, 32 ENERGY POL’Y 500, § 5, 9 (2004).
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Carbon Tax
Jurisdiction
Denmark,
Finland,
Germany,
Netherlands,
Slovenia,
Sweden and
UK
Andersen,
2010124

Time
Period

Emission Reductions

Review of available studies of
the impacts of environmental
tax reforms finds no change in
1994– GHG emissions in Slovenia, an
2003 average reduction of 3.1% in
the other six countries with the
largest reduction (5.9%) in
Finland

Reduction
per Year

<1%

The national estimates, including those summarized by Andersen,
indicate that the respective carbon taxes reduced business-as-usual
emissions by less than 2% per year. That likely is less than the rate of
growth of business-as-usual emissions. It is not surprising, then, that
taxed emissions during this period increased in Denmark and Norway
although they declined in Sweden (see Annex 1).125
The two econometric studies spanning multiple countries yield
inconsistent results in terms of the countries whose taxes significantly
affect CO2 emissions. They specify different countries as having a
carbon tax and consequently different countries as being part of the
119. Andersen et al., supra note 115, at 58.
120. Folke Bohlin, The Swedish Carbon Dioxide Tax: Effects on Biofuel Use and Carbon
Dioxide Emissions, 15 BIOMASS AND BIOENERGY 283, 283 (1998). The estimated abatement of
0.5 to 1.5 million tons CO2 on a yearly basis is equivalent to a 1.5% to 4.5% reduction of emissions
subject to the CO2 tax.
121. Julius J. Andersson, Cars, Carbon Taxes and CO2 Emissions 32 (Grantham Research
Inst. on Climate Change & the Env’t, Working Paper No. 212, 2017). Statistics Sweden reports
that the population increased from 8,590,630 in 1990 to 9,047,752 in 2005, an increase of 5.3%
over the period. Statistics Sweden, Population and Population Changes 1749–2017,
https://www.scb.se/en/finding-statistics/statistics-by-subject-area/population/populationcomposition/population-statistics/pong/tables-and-graphs/yearly-statistics--the-whole-country/
population-and-population-changes/. For an average year, the 6.3% reduction in per capita
transport emissions would be partially offset by a 2.6% increase in population, resulting in a 3.9%
reduction in actual CO2 transport emissions.
122. Lin & Li, supra note 13, at 5144.
123. MIDEKSA & KALLBEKKEN, supra note 13, at 5 (“[A]lthough carbon taxes fail to reduce
emissions in most countries, the results for Sweden and the U.K. suggest the presence of a
statistically significant and negative relationship between carbon taxes and CO2 emissions.”).
124. Andersen, supra note 13, at 4 fig.2.
125. Estimations of taxed emissions for Finland are unavailable.
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control group. 126 They also specify different control groups. 127 Their
dependent variables—total and per capita CO2 emissions—include
many emissions sources not subject to the carbon taxes.128 Both studies
find that few of the taxes led to a significant reduction in business-asusual emissions. Reductions of business-as-usual emissions are not
systematically related to reductions in actual emissions.129
All of the studies conclude that the European carbon taxes
reduced emissions relative to business-as-usual, but the annual
reductions are relatively small. As a result, actual emissions subject to
the carbon taxes continued to rise in most of these countries. Although
it relates to the Norwegian carbon tax, the following statement
succinctly summarizes the early European carbon tax experience: “the
taxes as they are executed have limited effect, and the sectors where
the tax would have been efficient, are exempted.”130
3. European carbon taxes and other policies since 2008
Almost all of the countries with a carbon tax have been part of the
EU ETS since 2008.131 With the exception of the Carbon Price Floor in
the UK, the carbon taxes apply almost exclusively to non-ETS
emissions. This creates a natural experiment: changes in non-ETS
emissions can be compared for the group of countries with a carbon tax
and the group without a tax. Carbon taxes should yield larger
reductions in non-ETS emissions for the group with taxes. For
individual countries where we have data, estimates of changes in taxed
emissions can be compared with changes in non-ETS emissions.
Carbon taxes should reduce taxed emissions more than non-ETS
emissions.

126. Compare Lin & Li, supra note 13, at 5140 (including Austria in the control group), with
MIDEKSA & KALLBEKKEN, supra note 13, at 3 (considering Austria to have a carbon tax).
127. Compare Lin & Li, supra note 13, at 5140 (including only European OECD countries in
the control group), with MIDEKSA & KALLBEKKEN, supra note 13 at 3 (including European and
non-European OECD members in the control group).
128. Compare Lin & Li, supra note 13, at 5140 (using per capita CO2 emissions as their
dependent variable), with MIDEKSA & KALLBEKKEN, supra note 13, at 3 (using total CO2
emissions as their dependent variable).
129. If business-as-usual emissions are rising rapidly statistically significant reductions may
not be sufficient to lower actual emissions subject to the carbon tax. If business-as-usual emissions
are growing slowly (or declining), statistically insignificant reductions could lower actual
emissions.
130. Bruvoll & Larsen, supra note 118, at 501.
131. See supra Table 1. Japan and Switzerland have a tax but are not part of the EU ETS.
Croatia is not included in the non-tax group because it did not join the EU ETS until 2013.
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Excluding the UK, thirteen countries that participate in the EU
ETS have a carbon tax, including countries for which we do not have
data on emissions subject to the carbon tax. 132 Three of those
countries—Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway—are not part of the
EU. Sixteen countries that participate in the EU ETS do not have a
carbon tax.133 The countries with a carbon tax account for roughly 33%
of the total GHG emissions (excluding LULUCF) and 34% of the nonETS emissions of the 29 countries. Several of the carbon taxes were
introduced after 2008; when comparing rates of emission reduction
since 2008, this favors carbon taxes.
The EU effort-sharing allocations provide a rough indication of
the comparability of the tax and non-tax groups in terms of their
expected reductions in non-ETS emissions. The effort-sharing
allocations are national targets for reduction of non-ETS emissions
from 2013 through 2020.134 The allocations reflect politically negotiated
judgments on equity, emission reduction potential and other
considerations. Since they are not member states, the effort-sharing
allocations do not apply to Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway, leaving
10 countries in the tax group with such allocations. In aggregate, the
annual reductions in non-ETS emissions required from the 10 tax
countries exceed those of the group without a tax by -1.16% to 0.98%.135 In short, the two groups are reasonably comparable although
the tax countries are expected to achieve slightly larger annual
reductions in their non-ETS emissions.
The EU member states are expected to meet their effort-sharing
allocations with EU-wide, national and sub-national policies. EU-wide
policies that help reduce non-ETS emissions include CO2 standards for
132. See MÉTIVIER ET AL., supra note 27, at 3 (listing jurisdictions with carbon taxes,
including thirteen which participate in the EU ETS: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Iceland,
Ireland, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Poland, Portugal, Norway, Slovenia, and Sweden). The UK is
excluded because its Carbon Price Floor applies to emissions covered by the EU ETS. David
Hirst, Carbon Price Floor (CPF) and the Price Support Mechanism 7 (House of Commons
Library, Briefing Paper No. 05927, 2018).
133. Austria, Belguim, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain.
134. Decision 406/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009, 2009
O.J. (L 140) 137; Commission Decision 2013/634, annex I, 2013 O.J. (L 292) 21 (EC). The policy
came into effect in 2013, so earlier data are not available. The 2013 to 2020 period is assumed to
provide a better comparison of the comparability of the tax and non-tax groups.
135. See Commission Decision 2013/634, annex I, 2013 O.J. (L 292) 21 (EU) (providing the
adjustments to Member States’ annual emission allocations for the period from 2013 to 2020).
Among the countries with a carbon tax, the national allocations range from -3.08% per year for
Ireland to +1.09% per year for Latvia. For non-tax countries, the national allocations range from
-5.53% per year for Cyprus to +2.13% per year for Romania.
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road vehicles and standards for buildings and energy-related products.
Member states, their sub-national jurisdictions, public entities, and
private entities are expected to implement additional measures, which
may include a carbon tax, to meet their allocation. The rates of change
of non-ETS emissions for 2008–16 were -1.10% per year for the 13
countries with a carbon tax and -1.28% per year for the 16 countries
without a tax.136 Thus, despite having implemented carbon taxes, nonETS emissions declined less in the countries with a tax suggesting that
other policies and developments contributed to the emission
reductions in all of the countries.
A recent evaluation of the Swiss carbon tax used two different
models and a large survey of taxed and tax-exempt businesses to
estimate its impact on emissions.137 All three approaches estimated that
the tax reduced emissions. Cumulative reductions to 2015 are
estimated at 4.1 to 8.6 MtCO2 (3.5% to 7.0%) with relatively larger
reductions in 2015 (0.8 to 1.8 MtCO2, 4.3% to 9.6%) due to increases
in the tax rate. The residential sector accounts for about 75% of the
reductions. One of the models was used to analyze the impact of other
measures and concluded that they accounted for about 25% of the
emission reductions in 2015.
The rates of change in non-ETS emissions and taxed emissions for
specific countries are compared in Table 6. In most of the countries,
taxed emissions represent a large share of the non-ETS emissions. If
the decline in taxed emissions exceeds the decline in non-ETS
emissions, the tax is likely helping to reduce the non-ETS emissions. If
non-ETS emissions decline faster than the taxed emissions, the policies
and other factors responsible for the decline in the non-ETS emissions
likely helped to reduce the taxed emissions as well. In only one of the
seven countries—Denmark—did the taxed emissions decline more
than the non-ETS emissions, again suggesting that other policies and
developments contributed to the reduction of taxed emissions.

136. The recession of 2009 led to a substantial decline in emissions for 2009 with a partial
recovery in 2010. Rates of change calculated from 2008 are not impacted by the effects of the
recession.
137. See generally Bundesamt für Umwelt BAFU, Faktenblatt Wirkungsabschätzung und
Evaluation
der
CO2-Abgabe
auf
Brennstoffe
(Feb.
19,
2018)
(Switz.),
https://www.bafu.admin.ch/dam/bafu/de/dokumente/klima/fachinfo-daten/
wirkungsabschaetzungco2-abgabefaktenblatt.pdf.
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Table 6. Annual Rates of Change in non-ETS Emissions and
Taxed Emissions Selected Countries and Periods
Change
Change
Taxed as % of
in nonin taxed
non-ETS
Country
Period
ETS
emissions
emissions 2016
emissions
Denmark
2008–
-1.96
-10.61
67%
2016
Iceland
2010–
-8.37
-3.08
101%
2016
Ireland
2010–
-0.05
2.76
42%
2016
Norway
2008–
-3.03
-2.49
57%
2016
Slovenia
2008–
-1.68
15.93
70%
2016
Sweden
2008–
-3.18
-2.13
64%
2016
Switzerland
2013–
-2.46
-2.13
29%
2016
The EU climate and energy package that became law early in 2009
comprised of legislation to reduce EU GHG emissions by at least 20%
below 1990 levels by 2020, supply at least 20% of EU energy
consumption from renewable resources by 2020, and improve energy
efficiency by at least 20% relative to projected levels by 2020. Energy
efficiency and renewable energy measures implemented by residential,
commercial, and small industrial facilities would contribute to lower
taxed emissions.
In summary, while taxed emissions have declined since 2008 in
several European countries, non-ETS emissions, with the exception of
those of Denmark, have experienced larger reductions. This suggests
that other policies and developments probably have contributed
substantially to the observed reductions in taxed emissions in countries
that have implemented carbon taxes.
C. Why have carbon taxes had such limited impact on emissions?
A carbon tax should increase the prices of emitting activities,
providing an incentive to consumers to shift to less polluting activities.
If the tax is to be effective, the tax rate must be sufficiently high to
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motivate consumers to change their consumption patterns. If the
emission reductions are to be sustained, or increased, the tax rate must
be adjusted for inflation, increases in income, and the effects of
technological change. This section argues that, with few exceptions, tax
rates have been too low to have a significant impact on consumption
patterns, tax rates often are not adjusted with the frequency and scale
needed to sustain or increase the emission reductions, and the
empirical relationship between tax rate increases and emission
reductions is not well understood.
1. Tax rates
Carbon taxes are applied mainly to transportation fuels and fossil
fuels used for residential, commercial, and institutional heating.138 In
most jurisdictions, these fuels are subject to excise and other taxes
regardless of whether they are also subject to a carbon tax. The price
signal to the consumer is the effect of the carbon tax on the retail price,
including all other taxes. In a few jurisdictions, Finland and Sweden for
example, the introduction of the carbon tax was accompanied by a
corresponding reduction in the amount of excise tax. In those cases, the
carbon tax has no impact on the retail price until the carbon tax exceeds
the excise tax reduction.
The price elasticity of demand measures the consumer response to
a change in the price of a product. For transportation fuels the price
elasticity is low (highly inelastic) in the short run and more elastic in
the long run.139 This means that the initial response to a price increase
is small, but a larger adjustment will occur over time if the price
increase is sustained. In other words, to produce a noticeable reduction
in emissions from the consumption of gasoline and diesel fuel, a carbon
tax must have a substantial impact on the retail prices of these fuels.
Table 7 shows carbon taxes as a share of diesel fuel prices in various
European countries for 2005–14.140

138. See WORLD BANK P’SHIP FOR MARKET READINESS, supra note 1, at 76–77 tbl.16
(detailing the scope of various planned carbon taxes).
139. See Xavier Labandeira et al., A Meta-Analysis on the Price Elasticity of Energy Demand,
102 ENERGY POL’Y 549, 553 tbl.4 (2017) (finding the average short- and long-term price
elasticities of car fuels to be 0.180 and 0.372, respectively).
140. The diesel fuel price data are not available after 2014.
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Table 7. Carbon Tax as a Share of Diesel Fuel Price 2005–14 for
Selected Countries
Carbon tax
Diesel price
Tax as % of
Country
(USD/liter)
(USD/liter)
price
2.80% to
Denmark
0.04 to 0.08
1.45 to 1.89
4.42%
0.70% to
Iceland
0.02 to 0.03
1.45 to 1.89
1.38%
3.15% to
Ireland
0.05 to 0.07
1.31 to 2.06
3.86%
4.41% to
Norway
0.08 to 0.14
1.69 to 2.35
6.65%
2.43% to
Slovenia
0.04 to 0.05
1.21 to 1.77
3.83%
19.22% to
Sweden
0.33 to 0.43
1.44 to 2.16
26.62%
With the exception of Sweden, the carbon tax is less than 5% of
the retail price and is relatively constant over time. Sweden has the
highest carbon tax rates (see Table 1), so those results are not
surprising. Comparison of the carbon tax (second column) with the
range of diesel prices (third column) indicates that the tax is
substantially smaller than fluctuations in the retail price even in
Sweden. In short, the European carbon taxes, with the exception of
Sweden, constitute a small, relatively fixed share of the diesel fuel price
that is lost in the “noise” of price changes. Therefore, they are unlikely
to have stimulated an appreciable reduction in related emissions.
Fossil fuels used for residential, commercial, and institutional
heating typically are not as heavily taxed as transportation fuels, so a
given tax rate would generate a larger price signal for consumers.
However, research into the adoption of energy efficiency measures
indicates that many market barriers inhibit adjustments to energy price
increases, so the emissions reductions due to a carbon tax may be
smaller and slower to materialize than projected.141

141. See Nadia Ameli & Nicola Brandt, What Impedes Household Investment in Energy
Efficiency and Renewable Energy, 8 INT’L REV. ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 101, 129 tbl.1 (2014)
(citing energy prices as a barrier to energy investment and policy solutions); Todd D. Gerarden
et al., Assessing the Energy-Efficiency Gap, 55 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1486, 1486–87 (2017)
(“[T]here is a broadly held view that various barriers to the adoption of energy-efficient
technologies have prevented the realization of a substantial portion of these benefits.”); Kenneth
Gillingham & Karen Palmer, Bridging the Energy Efficiency Gap: Policy Insights from Economic
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Other emitting activities subject to carbon taxes are more sensitive
to price changes (more price elastic), but only limited information is
available. The UK carbon price floor applies to fossil fuels used to
generate electricity and changes the “merit order,” the sequence in
which generating units that use different fossil fuels are used. It was the
key driver behind the rapid decline of coal-fired generation since 2013
because the tax makes many coal-fired units more costly to operate
than gas-fired units. 142 Australia’s carbon pricing mechanism led to
similar changes in the mix of generating units used there.143 In a similar
vein, replacement of coal by biofuel in the district heating sector was
the largest source of emission reductions attributed to the Swedish
carbon tax during its early years.144
2. Scale and frequency of tax rate changes
Jurisdictions that implement a carbon tax must adjust the tax rate over
time to achieve their emission reduction objectives. Inflation and
increases in income reduce the effectiveness of a given tax rate over
time. Technological change, fossil fuel price changes, and other
developments can also reduce the effectiveness of a give tax rate over
time. Thus, to sustain or increase the emission reductions due to a
carbon tax, the tax rate must rise over time. Data on the scale and
frequency of tax rate changes are presented in Table 8. For most of the
taxes, the increases in the tax rate have exceeded the rate of inflation.

Theory and Empirical Evidence, 8 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 18, 19 (2014) (“[M]arket
failures . . . can lead to inefficiently low levels of investment in energy efficiency.”).
142. See AURORA ENERGY RESEARCH, THE CARBON PRICE THAW: POST-FREEZE FUTURE
OF THE GB CARBON PRICE 4 (2017) (stating that Great Britain’s Carbon Price Support (“CPS”),
a component of its Carbon Price Floor (“CPF”), “was the key driver behind the rapid decline of
coal generation since 2013”).
143. See Marianna O’Gorman & Frank Jotzo, Impact of the Carbon Price on Australia’s
Electricity Demand, Supply and Emissions 26–28 (Ctr. for Climate Econ. & Pol’y, Working Paper
No. 1411, 2014) (discussing the significant impact that Australia’s carbon price has had on the
brown and black coal markets).
144. Bohlin, supra note 120, at 289.
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Table 8. Scale and Frequency of Tax Rate Changes
Average
annual
rate of
inflation
over the
same
period

Percent of
years with
no rate
increase
after the
first 5
years

Years
of data

Average
annual
change to
the tax
rate (%)

CO2-tax on
mineral oil

22

3.74

3.45%

0%

0

Tax on offshore
CO2 emissions

17

-2.41

3.56%

44%

3

Tax on
fluorinated gases

13

5.98

3.37%

0%

0

23

5.64

1.68%

52%

5

Duty on CO2

23

2.96

1.38%

56%

11

Fluorinated gases
tax

3

0.00

0.56%

Tax on CO2

17

1.92

4.73%

Fluorinated gases
tax

6

18.47

0.96%

British Columbia

8

14.72

1.03%

100%

4

Switzerland

8

27.54

-0.12%

25%

2

Liechtenstein

8

27.54

-0.12%

25%

2

Natural gas and
liquids carbon tax

6

4.68

1.55%

2

Solid fuel carbon
tax

3

4.88

2.19%

1

Jurisdiction/tax

Longest
period
with no
increase
(years)

Norway

Sweden
Denmark

4

Slovenia
79%

14
1

Ireland

Iceland

6

7.80

3.27%

1

Japan

4

44.90

0.94%

1

United Kingdom

2

91.31

1.20%

0

France

2

51.72

0.68%

0

Source. Calculated from data in Annex 1. Inflation rates calculated from World
Bank data on GDP
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Over the past decade, several jurisdictions, including British
Columbia, France, Japan, and the UK have phased in a carbon tax over
a period of three to five years with large percentage increases every
year or two over that period. Carbon taxes that have been in effect
longer have much smaller average annual increases. Norway adjusts its
tax rates, including its carbon tax rates, for the effect of inflation each
year. These increases have not been sufficient to reduce taxed
emissions. Iceland and Ireland have raised their tax rates at one- or
two-year intervals, as has Slovenia for its fluorinated gases tax.
Switzerland has adjusted its tax rate, which also applies in
Liechtenstein, at two- or three-year intervals in an effort to achieve its
emission reduction target with a substantial rate increase on each
occasion. Tax rate changes in other jurisdictions appear to be more ad
hoc.
Despite the annual increases to the Norwegian tax rates, the
frequent increases in Switzerland, and the increases during the phasein periods in other jurisdictions, tax rates rise only about 60% of the
time on a year-over-year basis. This reflects the fact that governments
change and that a given government faces environmental, economic
and political pressures as it considers a tax rate increase. Even
announced schedules of tax rate increase are subject to change. When
the UK carbon price floor was introduced in April 2013, it was
scheduled to rise yearly to £30/tCO2 in 2020 but was capped at £18/tCO2
from 2016 in the 2014 budget.145
3. Changes to carbon tax rates and associated changes in
emissions
To examine the relationship between changes in tax rates and
changes in emissions, we identify periods with rising tax rates—at least
four years with no more than one year without an increase. The annual
rates of change for the tax rate and emissions are calculated for each of
the eleven periods. The periods range in length from four to 22 years.
The emissions changes are calculated for the same periods as the tax
rate changes. The time period for which emission reductions are
calculated should lag the time period during which rates rise, but we do
not know the appropriate lag. In theory, the longer the time period, the
145. See Hirst, supra note 132, at 3 (“At Budget 2014 the Government announced that the
CPS component of the floor price would be capped at a maximum of £18/tCO2 from 2016 to 2020
to limit the competitive disadvantage faced by business and reduce energy bills for consumers.
This price freeze was extended to 2021 in Budget 2016.”).
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larger the share of emissions reductions should occur during the same
period.146
Higher rates of tax rate increases would be expected to lead to
greater emission reductions. The annual rates of changes to tax rates
and emissions are shown in Figure 1. The expected relationship would
be a curve sloping downward to the right. Low rates of tax rate increase
might not be sufficient to reduce actual emissions, so for tax rate
increases near the origin emissions might not decline (be above the
horizontal axis). For high rates of tax rate increase, annual emissions
would be expected to decline (be below the horizontal axis).

Clearly, the data relating to the existing carbon taxes do not fall
neatly into the expected pattern. For tax rate changes of up to 30% per
year, emissions increases (5 cases) are almost twice as common as
emissions reductions (3 cases). The effects of other policies on
emissions subject to carbon taxes may be part of the explanation, but
more research into the relationship between tax rate changes and
emissions reductions is needed.

146. If the lag is two years, a four-year period only captures the full effect of the tax rate
change during the first two years, but a 22-year period captures the full impact for the tax rate
changes during the first 20 years.
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D. Summary
We were able to compile emissions data for 17 carbon taxes in 12
jurisdictions. Only six of the 17 taxes have reduced actual emissions
subject to the tax—Denmark (duty on CO2), Japan, Slovenia
(fluorinated gases), Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. The rates of
change of taxed emissions vary widely, from a reduction of over 42%
per year for the UK carbon price floor to an increase of more than 24%
per year for fluorinated gases in Denmark.
Multiple assessments of European carbon taxes implemented
prior to 2008 and of the British Columbia carbon tax consistently find
that carbon taxes have reduced emissions relative to business-as-usual.
These assessments cover fewer taxes for shorter periods than our
estimates of changes in taxed emissions. Our estimates of taxed
emissions indicate that the reductions from business-as-usual were not
large enough to reduce actual emissions except in the case of Sweden.
We found only one post-2008 evaluation of a European carbon
tax: the Swiss tax. Comparison of post-2008 data on non-ETS emissions
and taxed emissions in European countries that participate in the EU
ETS suggests that other policies and developments contributed to the
reduction of taxed emissions in most of those countries. The evaluation
of the Swiss carbon tax estimates the contribution of other policies at
about 25%.
Tax rates, with the exception of Sweden and Switzerland, are
probably too low to materially affect emissions by most taxed sources.
Only the tax rates in Sweden, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and Finland
exceed the carbon price thought to be needed in 2020 to hold the global
average temperature increase to well below 2°C above pre-industrial
levels, in line with the Paris Agreement. 147 To sustain or increase
emission reductions, tax rates need to be adjusted regularly to
compensate for inflation, income increases and other factors. In most
jurisdictions, the scale and frequency of the rate changes has not been
sufficient to stimulate further emissions reductions.
V. REDUCTION IN EMISSIONS SUBJECT TO GHG ETSS
This section calculates changes in emissions covered by various
GHG ETSs, considers the relationship between changes in emissions
147. See WORLD BANK, supra note 25, at 34 (“Currently, only the carbon taxes in Finland,
Lichtenstein, Sweden and Switzerland have carbon price rates that are consistent with the 2020
price range recommended by the High–Level Commission on Carbon Prices.”); WORLD BANK
CARBON PRICING LEADERSHIP COAL., supra note 77, at 51 (referring to the Paris Agreement
2030 temperature increase target of “well below 2ºC”).
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caps and changes in emissions, and reviews other assessments of the
performance of GHG trading systems.
A. Changes in emissions covered by GHG ETSs
Most ETSs report aggregate data on the allowances and offsets
surrendered and financial payments made for compliance. We used
that information to calculate the verified emissions covered by the
ETSs. 148 As discussed in section III.A, the amounts are actual
emissions with no adjustments for leakage or emission changes due to
use of the ETS revenue. In a few jurisdictions—California, European
Union, Quebec and Switzerland—there have been significant changes
in the scope of the ETS. These are treated as separate ETSs for
purposes of the analysis. The aviation component of the EU ETS
likewise is treated as a separate ETS because it has its own allowances.
The annual rates of reduction are calculated using the actual
emissions for the first year as the base because pre-ETS emissions data
are not always available, and where available, are sometimes
considered to be inflated. This approach excludes reductions during
the first year of the ETS. Annual emissions data sometimes are not
available for ETSs with multi-year compliance periods such as RGGI;
then we use the data for the first period as the basis for calculating the
second period reductions.

148. The verified emissions, in tCO2e, are equal to the sum of the allowances and other units
surrendered to achieve compliance plus the emissions covered by fixed price compliance
payments in Alberta and New Zealand. For the New Zealand ETS, the figure was doubled to get
the verified emissions because compliance required submission of one allowance for emissions of
two tCO2e.
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Table 9. Annual Rates of Change in Emissions Caps and
Emissions Covered by GHG ETSs for Selected Periods149

Jurisdiction

Period

European
Union
EU ETS
Aviation

2008–
2012
2012–
2016
2007–
2013
2011–
2016
2008–
2012
2012–
2014
2010–
2015

Alberta
New
Zealand
Switzerland
RGGI
Tokyo*
Saitama*

2011–
2014

Average
Annual
Change in
Emissions
Cap
%/year

Average
Annual
Emission
Change
%/year

2013–
2016

-1.87

-4.14

2013–
2016

-0.72

-4.52

Average
Annual
Change in
Emissions
Cap
%/year

Average
Annual
Emission
Change
%/year

Period

0

-1.61

0

-7.58

NA

2.51

NA

6.50

1.48

-1.98

-9.27

-6.40

NA

-3.03

NA

-1.36

* These are rates of change for energy use because the carbon content of
electricity is assumed to be constant. The carbon content of electricity rose as a
result of greater reliance on fossil-fired generation due to the shutdown of most
nuclear generators after the 2011 great east Japan earthquake and tsunami.

The annual rates of change in emissions covered by the ETSs are
summarized in Table 9. The data cover forty-five jurisdictions; the
seven Chinese pilots are not included because they treat emissions data
149. Calculated from individual ETSs data for allowances/offsets surrendered, emissions
caps, and banked allowances. Data are reported by the individual ETSs. See Alberta
(http://aep.alberta.ca/climate-change/reports-and-data/default.aspx); California (https://arb.ca.
gov/cc/inventory/data/data.htm);
EU
ETS
(https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/
registry_en#tab-0-1); New Zealand ETS Annual Reports and Facts and Figures
(https://www.epa.govt.nz/resources-and-publications/monitoring-and-reporting/?tag=73);
Quebec (http://www.mddelcc.gouv.qc.ca/changements/carbone/Couverture-en.htm); RGGI
(https://www.rggi.org/allowance-tracking/emissions); Switzerland (https://www.emissionsregistry.
admin.ch/crweb/public/reporting/surrendering/list.do?org.apache.struts.taglib.html.TOKEN=5a
bfbed80e6880a2d258fc5d448a684a); Tokyo (http://www.metro.tokyo.jp/ENGLISH/TOPICS/
2016/161116.htm). For more detailed data see Masayo Wakabayashi & Osamu Kimura, The
Impact of the Tokyo Metropolitan Emissions Trading Scheme on Reducing Greenhouse Gas
Emissions: Findings From A Facility-Based Study, 18 Climate Pol’y 1028, 1034 fig.2 (2018).

3. Haites Final Word Doc Original Spacing (Do Not Delete)

1/4/2019 4:34 PM

158

[Vol. XXIX:109

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

as confidential. Quebec, which only reports data by compliance period,
and South Korea, where the results of the first compliance period have
not yet been reported, also are excluded. We exclude California from
the table because the rates of change are calculated over one or two
years and hence may not be indicative. The data for the two regional
ETSs—EU ETS and RGGI—are aggregate, rather than jurisdictionspecific, emissions. Thus, we have data for eight ETSs, but for two of
them there are two periods with different coverage yielding a total of
ten jurisdictions/ETS combinations.
Actual emissions have fallen in at least six of the ETSs covering 41
jurisdictions, with annual rates of emission reductions up to 6.4%.
Emissions increased in Alberta, New Zealand, and possibly in Tokyo
and Saitama—notably the four ETSs that do not have an emissions cap.
The fact that actual emissions increased does not mean the ETS had no
impact on emissions, just that the impact was not sufficient to reduce
actual emissions given other developments.
The Alberta Specified Gas Emitters Regulation (SGER) applied
to installations with emissions in excess of 100 ktCO2e. 150 An
installation subject to the SGER was required to reduce emissionsintensity per unit of production by a specified percentage relative to its
historic baseline.151 Aggregate emissions were not capped. The growth
in actual emissions was due, in part, to an increase in the number of
installations subject to the regulation and increased output by
participants.
The New Zealand ETS does not have an emissions cap. 152
Participants are required to submit eligible domestic and international
allowances and offsets equal to half of their actual emissions.153 Until
2015 there was no limit on the use of international allowances and
offsets. Beginning in 2010, the prices of those units fell significantly
with the result that they accounted for over 95% of the units
150. In 2018 the Alberta SGER was replaced by the Carbon Competitiveness Incentive
Regulation (CCIR). Alta. Reg. 255/2017 (Can.). For a discussion of the CCIR, see generally
Mascher, supra note 15.
151. See id. at 1015 (“The SGER required covered facilities to reduce emissions-intensity
(emissions per unit of production) by a specified percentage (12% in 2007–14; 15% in 2016; 20%
in 2017) relative to their historic performance.”).
152. See Catherine Leining et al., Evolution of New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme:
Linking Lessons Learned from the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme 1 (Motu Econ. & Pub.
Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. 17-06, 2017) (explaining that, as of 2017, “no cap has applied to
the issuance of domestic units” under the New Zealand ETS).
153. See id. at 17 (discussing the 2009 New Zealand ETS amendments that “introduce[d] a
‘one-for-two’ unit obligation to limit exposure of non-forestry sectors to half of the international
emissions price through 2012”).
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surrendered for compliance from 2012 through 2014. 154 Use of
international allowances and offsets was banned after 2014.155
The Tokyo and Saitama ETSs claim emission reductions, but
actual emissions may have increased. Electricity accounts for a large
share of the emissions covered by these ETSs for which a constant
carbon intensity is assumed.156 The great east Japan earthquake and
tsunami of 2011 led to the gradual shutdown of all nuclear generating
stations and greater reliance on fossil-fired generation which increased
the carbon intensity of electricity supplied to Tokyo and Saitama.157
Unfortunately, the share of total emissions due to electricity use is
not available for either ETS, so the impact on actual emissions cannot
be calculated. Entity-specific emissions data for 985 facilities covered
by the Tokyo ETS from 2010 through 2015 suggest a small increase in
actual emissions due to the change in the generation mix.158
California is excluded from Table 9 because the time periods over
which emission changes can be calculated are very short, so the trends
may not be meaningful. Although it has multi-year compliance periods,
California publishes annual emissions of entities subject to its ETS.
Our standard approach of using the first year as the base for
calculating emission changes yields only a one-year change (a 0.40%
increase) for the first compliance period and (a 1.68% decline) for the
second period. Using data for the year prior to the start of each phase
yields two-year annual reductions of -4.81% and -2.79% respectively

154. Haites, supra note 37, at 253 tbl.2.
155. See N.Z. MINISTRY FOR THE ENV’T, supra note 41, at 26 (“The New Zealand carbon
market had full exposure to international markets up to the end of 2014.”). Proposed changes to
the New Zealand ETS set the supply of allowances on a rolling, five-year basis consistent with
New Zealand’s emissions target, introduce auctioning, and phase-in a one unit per tCO2
compliance obligation between 2017 and 2019. See N.Z. MINISTRY FOR THE ENV’T,
IMPROVEMENTS TO THE NEW ZEALAND EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME: CONSULTATION
DOCUMENT 9–13 (Aug. 2018) (discussing proposed changes to the New Zealand ETS that the
government currently seeks to introduce through legislative amendments by the end of 2019).
156. That assumption means the reported reductions are changes in energy use, rather than
changes in emissions.
157. See Wakabayashi & Kimura, supra note 149, at 1030 (“The carbon intensity of electricity
increased after the earthquake in 2011 due to the shutdown of nuclear of nuclear plants, which
led to a greater use of fossil-fuel generation.”).
158. An analysis of compliance reports submitted by 985 facilities subject to the Tokyo ETS
for the 2010–15 period indicates that the emissions intensity of electricity supplied to the Tokyo
region increased as a result of greater reliance on fossil-fired generation leading to an estimated
increase in emissions by those facilities of 0.35% per year. The impact on total emissions covered
by the ETS is not known due to changes in the number of participating facilities. For more on the
impact of the great east Japan earthquake and tsunami on emissions subject to the Tokyo ETS,
see id. at 1038–39.
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for the two compliance periods. The ETS designs vary widely in terms
of compliance period, price stability mechanisms, use of offsets, and
other features. Yet when ETSs without an emissions cap are excluded,
actual emissions have fallen.
Other policies, including vehicle fuel taxes, energy efficiency
standards, and renewable energy incentives, contributed to the
emission reductions. 159 External factors, including changes in fuel
prices and economic conditions, also had an impact. The recession and
financial crisis led to a drop in emissions during 2009 in several ETSs.
Additionally, a decline in natural gas prices in the US due to shale gas
production led to fuel switching and lower emissions by RGGI
participants.
B. Changes in emissions and emissions caps
Most jurisdictions that implement a GHG ETS limit the aggregate
emissions by participants. When such an ETS is first implemented, the
emissions cap tends to be generous for several reasons:
• Participants lobby for a limit that requires minimal
reductions to keep compliance costs low;
• Equitable treatment of participants that implemented
emission reductions prior to the start of the ETS often takes
the form of early action credits or allocations that exceed
actual emissions; and
• The government may not have accurate data on historic
emissions.
Consequently, actual emissions are often less than the quantity of
allowances distributed leading to the accumulation of a bank of unused
allowances. The size of the allowance bank at any given time is difficult
to determine—information on the units distributed is usually available
but the quantity needed for compliance is not known for the same
date.160 Estimates of the size of the allowance bank for different ETSs

159. Data covering 28 EU ETS members from 2008–16 indicate annual rates of emissions
change between +1.78% and -7.84% with an overall average of -2.89%. Emissions by country are
calculated by summing the emissions of all installations in each country as reported to the Union
Registry. See, e.g., EU ETS UNION REGISTRY, CORRECTED TABLE OF VERIFIED 2016 EMISSIONS
(2016) (reporting annual emissions by installation from 2008 through 2016). All of these countries
had the same ETS design and allowance prices during that period, so the different rates reflect
differences in the mix of participants, local economic conditions, and other policies.
160. The EU ETS, for example, distributes free allowances for the current year (say 2018) on
February 28 and auctions other allowances at various times during the year. However,
installations have until April 30 to surrender allowances to cover their actual emissions during the
previous year (2017) and may use allowances already issued for the current year for that purpose,

3. Haites Final Word Doc Original Spacing (Do Not Delete)

Fall 2018]

1/4/2019 4:34 PM

CARBON TAXES & EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEMS

161

are provided in Table 10. All of these ETSs have accumulated
allowance banks. The banks range in size from 15% to over 500% (five
years) of the annual compliance obligation.
Table 10. Estimates of allowance banks accumulated by GHG
ETSs
Jurisdiction
EU ETS

Switzerland

RGGI

Period

Bank

Notes

2005–
2007

>15%

Surplus allowances not valid
for post 2007 compliance

2008–
2016

>100%

Use of Kyoto Protocol units
restricted

2008–
2012

>100%

Severe restrictions on post
2012 use of surplus 2008-12
units

2013–
2016

>50%

Use of Kyoto Protocol units
restricted

2009–
2011

>15%

Unallocated and unsold
allowances withdrawn

2012–
2014

>50%

Emissions cap reduced by
over 25%

New Zealand

2010–
2016

>500%

California and
Quebec

2013–
2016

>45%

Use of Kyoto Protocol units
banned after 2014. Bank
peaked at over 600% in
2015
Estimate by Busch, 2018 161

Tokyo

2010–
2015

>15%

so it is difficult to calculate the number of surplus units at any particular time. See EUROPEAN
COMM’N, supra note 28, at 101 (describing the compliance cycle).
161. See CHRIS BUSCH, ENERGY INNOVATION: POLICY & TECH. LLC, OVERSUPPLY
GROWS IN WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE CARBON MARKET: AN ADJUSTMENT FOR CURRENT
OVERSUPPLY IS NEEDED TO ENSURE THE PROGRAM WILL ACHIEVE ITS 2030 TARGET 30 (2017)
(“[T]he expected bank of allowances accumulated through 2020 is 26–45 percent of cumulative
WCI cap declines 2021–30.”).
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Note that in Table 10, “Bank” at the end of the period is expressed
as a percentage of the annual compliance obligation – annual emissions
except for New Zealand where the compliance obligation is one unit
for two tCO2 emitted. 100% means that the banked units are equal to
one year’s compliance obligation.
ETSs have utilized several measures to reduce the number of
banked allowances, including:
• Effective cancellation of surplus allowances—cancellation of
surplus European Union allowances (EUAs) at the end of
Phase 1 of the EU ETS, severe restrictions on the quantity of
2008–12 Swiss allowances (CHUs) that can be used for 2013–
20 compliance by Swiss ETS participants and withdrawal of
unallocated and unsold units by state governments
participating in RGGI;
• Severe restrictions on compliance use of external offset
credits—after 2012 compliance use of Kyoto Protocol units
was severely restricted by the EU and Swiss ETSs, and New
Zealand prohibited their use after 2014;
• Larger reductions of the emissions cap—a reduction in the
emissions cap by RGGI after 2009–12 and a shift from stable
emissions limits to annual reductions in the limit by the
California, EU, Quebec, RGGI and Swiss ETSs; and
• Delayed distribution of allowances—the EU ETS
“backloading” provision deferred the distribution of
allowances from 2014–16 to 2019–20.
In addition to the measures to reduce the allowance banks
mentioned in Table 10, ETS designs have changed in ways that should
reduce the accumulation of allowance banks. Many ETSs now have
declining annual emissions caps, although the caps generally are
declining more slowly than emissions (see Table 9).162 Market stability
reserves to manage the size of allowance banks have been adopted by
California-Quebec, EU and RGGI systems. While their designs differ,
all of the stability reserves withdraw allowances from the market when
the supply is abundant and release allowances if shortages arise. Data
on the effectiveness of these mechanisms are not yet available.
Governments clearly have been cautious in setting the limits for
their ETSs. However, emission reductions have occurred in most of the
ETSs despite the accumulation of surplus allowances. In effect,

162. See Narassimhan et al., supra note 48, at 972 tbl.2 (displaying slight annual reductions in
emissions caps across ETSs).
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participants assume that the ETS will continue and that the allowances
will be eligible for future compliance use despite instances where
surplus allowances have been discounted or cancelled.163
C. Other assessments of the performance of GHG ETSs
This section summarizes the findings of other studies that have
assessed the performance of various GHG ETSs.
The California ETS has been criticized on the grounds that its
treatment of imported electricity has led to leakage due to “resource
shuffling”, and that the bulk of the emission reductions stem from
command-and-control regulations that apply to sources covered by the
ETS.164
Evaluations of the New Zealand ETS concluded that it achieved
only minimal reductions of net emissions below business-as-usual
levels due to regulatory uncertainty and the ability to use unlimited
quantities of low cost imported units for compliance.165
Alberta’s SGER regulation was found to have “had no significant
impact on annual emissions or the emission intensity of the average

163. Cancelling or discounting distributed allowances leads to an economic loss for the
allowance owners, but the financial loss may be small since most allowances are distributed for
free. Provisions governing the distribution of free allowances differ by ETS and change over time.
The EU ETS distributed over 95% of the allowances free during the first (2005–07) and second
(2008–12) phases. During the third (2013–20) phase free allowances are provided to industry
sectors deemed to be exposed to carbon leakage, while the free allocation to other industries
declines from 80% to 30% and electricity generators get no free allowances. See EUROPEAN
COMM’N, supra note 28, at 23–25). RGGI, which covers only fossil-fired electricity generation,
auctions over 90% of its allowances. See RAMSEUR, supra note 97, at 2. California issues free
allowances to industries but the allocations start to decline in 2018. Investor-owned electric and
gas utilities get free allowances on behalf of their customers. During the first (2013–14)
compliance period about 6% of the allowances were auctioned. See ICAP, USA CALIFORNIA
CAP-AND TRADE PROGRAM 3 (2018). New Zealand provides intensity-based free allocation for
eligible activities with 90% free allowances for highly EITE activities and 60% free allowances
for moderately EITE activities. For the 2015–16 fiscal year, about 64% of allowances were
distributed free. See ICAP, NEW ZEALAND EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME 3 (2018). Between
2008 and 2012, each participant received a free allocation equal to its negotiated emissions target.
Since 2013 the allocation process has been similar to that of the EU ETS. See ICAP, SWISS ETS
2 (2018). As baseline-and-credit systems, participants in the Alberta and Tokyo trading systems
effectively receive a free allowance allocation equal to their baseline. The Chinese pilot trading
systems distribute virtually all allowances for free. See Zhe Deng et al., supra note 11, at 994 tbl.1.
164. See, e.g., Guri Bang et al., supra note 29, at 24–25; Caron et al., supra note 63, at 32–33;
Danny Cullenward, The Limits of Administrative Law as Regulatory Oversight in Linked Carbon
Markets, 33 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 17–18 (2015).
165. See N.Z. MINISTRY FOR THE ENV’T, supra note 41, at 40 (“The New Zealand ETS
appears to have contributed, but only minimally, to changes in behavior and decisions that have
reduced net emissions below business-as-usual levels.”); see generally Leining et al., supra note
152 (discussing the history of the New Zealand ERS, outcomes, and pitfalls).
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regulated facility across any of the sectors except the pulp and paper
industry.”166
RGGI has been assessed from several perspectives. During 2009–
15, electric power CO2 emissions and electricity prices declined in
RGGI states, while in other states, emissions and prices increased.167
Between 2009 and 2012, RGGI is estimated to have been responsible
for about half of the decline in the region’s fossil-fired generating plant
emissions. 168 Lower natural gas prices, other environmental policies,
and the 2009 recession were responsible for the rest.169 Use of auction
revenue for energy efficiency, renewable energy, and other measures
also contributed to the emission reductions. 170 Part of the emissions
reduction may have been offset by higher emissions in neighboring
states. 171 RGGI is providing positive economic impacts and public
health benefits while meeting its emission reduction objectives.172
Reviews of the Swiss ETS conclude that the pressure on
participants to reduce their CO2 emissions has practically vanished due
to the abundant supply and consequent low prices of allowances.173 The

166. Deepak Rajagopal, Firm Behaviors and Emissions under Emissions Intensity
Regulation: Evidence from Alberta’s Specific Gas Emitters Regulation 1 (Oct. 17, 2014) (on file
with
UCLA
Inst.
Of
Env’t
&
Sustainability,
Working
Paper
Series)
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5t40p9ht.
167. JORDAN STUTT ET AL., ACADIA CTR., REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE
STATUS REPORT: PART MEASURING SUCCESS 9 (2016).
168. See Murray & Maniloff, supra note 8, at 588 (“[E]missions would be 24% higher in the
region if the RGGI program were not in effect . . . about half of the region’s reductions can be
attributable directly to the RGGI program.”).
169. Id. at 583.
170. Id. at 582.
171. See Harrison Fell & Peter Maniloff, Leakage in Regional Environmental Policy: The
Case of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 87 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 1, 17 (2018)
(“[R]educed generation in the RGGI region was not compensated for by increase in gas-fired
generation in the area, but rather RGGI led to an increase in generation from the areas
surrounding RGGI.”).
172. See PAUL J. HIBBARD ET AL., ANALYSIS GRP., THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE
REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE ON NINE NORTHEAST AND MID-ATLANTIC STATES
49 (2015) (“[M]arket-based programs are providing positive economic impacts while meeting
emission objectives.”); MICHELLE MANION ET AL., ABT ASSOCS., ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC
HEALTH IMPACTS OF THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, 2009–2014 1–3 (2017)
(“The RGGI program improved air quality throughout the Northeast states and created major
benefits to public health and productivity, including avoiding hundreds of premature deaths and
tens of thousands of lost work days.”).
173. FED. OFF. FOR THE ENV’T, EVALUATION OF INCENTIVE EFFECT OF EMISSIONS
TRADING SCHEME 9 (2015); see ZHAW ZURICH U. OF APPLIED SCI.—SCH. OF MGMT. & L.,
SWISS EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME CH ETS 5 (2018) (“The high amount of emission allowances
allocated free of charge in combination with the currently low prices per unit provide little
incentive for companies to implement reduction measures.”).
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supply has been increased by the closure of a large emitter and the
availability of imported compliance units. The situation is aggravated
by uncertainties related to banking of surplus allowances and the
possible link with the EU ETS (now agreed).
Not surprisingly, the EU ETS, the oldest and largest GHG ETS,
has been the subject of the most numerous evaluations. 174 The
European Environment Agency and, in recent years, the European
Commission publish annual reports on its operation. 175 Numerous
attempts to estimate the emission reductions achieved have been
published over the past decade. These are summarized in Table 11. The
table shows two groups of studies: studies that estimate the emission
reductions achieved by the EU ETS, and estimates of national emission
reductions.

174. See generally NORIKO FUJIWARA, META-ANALYSIS OF CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY
EVALUATIONS IN THE EU AND MEMBER STATES (2017); Sean Healy et al., Review of Literature
on EU ETS Performance: A Literature Review on GAP Analysis of Policy Evaluations (ÖkoInstitut, Working Paper No. 2/2015, 2015).
175. See generally Commission Report on the Functioning of the European Carbon Market,
COM (2017) 48 final (Feb. 1, 2017); European Env’t Agency, Rep. No. 18/2017, Trends and
Projections in the EU ETS in 2017: The EU Emissions Trading System in Numbers (2017),
https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/trends-and-projections-EU-ETS-2017; ANDREI MARCU
ET AL., EUROPEAN ROUNDTABLE ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND SUSTAINABLE TRANSITION ET
AL., THE 2018 STATE OF THE EU ETS REPORT (2018).
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Table 11. Estimates of the emission reductions achieved by the EU
ETS

176

Time
Period
2005–
2006

2005–
2007

2005–
2006

2005–
2007

Methodology
BAU = pre-2005
trend for emissions
intensity reduction,
about -1%/year
Ellerman and
Buchner
methodology. Same
result, expressed
differently
Fuel switching
emission reductions
using a power sector
model
Panel data
econometric analysis
used to estimate
BAU emissions

Emission
Reductions
2005–
2008–
2007
2012
50 to 100
MtCO2/y
ear

Study
Ellerman and
Buchner,
2008177

2 to 5%
of
emissions

Ellerman, et
al. 2010178

75
MtCO2/
year

Delarue, et
al., 2008179

247
MtCO2
over 3
years

Anderson and
DiMaria,
2011180

176. Difference in difference estimates a relationship between the emissions of ETS plants
and plants not subject to the ETS. These non-ETS plants are usually smaller plants in the same
industry and serve as the control group. Difference in difference looks at both groups during a
period prior to the start of the ETS and uses this relationship to estimate business-as-usual
emissions of the ETS plants after the ETS starts using actual data for control group plants. Thus,
the estimated emissions reflect actual economic conditions, fuel prices, and other policies;
therefore, the difference between the estimated and actual emissions is due to the ETS. For a
technical description of the methodology, see Sebastian Petrick & Ulrich J. Wagner, The Impact
of Carbon Trading on Industry: Evidence from German Manufacturing Firms 7–11 (Verein für
Socialpolitik, No. C11-V3, 2014) and Marit E. Klemetsen et al., The Impacts of the EU ETS on
Norwegian Plants’ Environmental and Economic Performance 22–24 (Statistics Nor., Discussion
Paper No. 833, 2016).
177. A. Denny Ellerman & Barbara K. Buchner, Over-Allocation or Abatement? A
Preliminary Analysis of the EU ETS Based on the 2005–06 Emissions Data, 41 ENVTL. &
RESOURCE ECON. 267, 286 (2008).
178. A. DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL., PRICING CARBON: THE EUROPEAN UNION EMISSIONS
TRADING SCHEME 191 (2010).
179. Erik Delarue et al., Fuel Switching in the Electricity Sector Under the EU ETS: Review
and Prospective, 134 J. ENERGY ENGINEERING 40 (2008).
180. Barry Anderson & Corrado Di Maria, Abatement and Allocation in the Pilot Phase of
the EU ETS, 48 ENV’T. & RESOURCE ECON. 83, 97 (2011).
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Emission
Reductions
Methodology
2005–
2008–
2007
2012
Compares 2005-06
Phase II
and 2007-08
led to
reductions using
reductdata for 2,101 firms
ions
Ellerman and
Intensity Intensity
Buchner
1%/
1 to
methodology Phase year
5%/yr
I results are base for lower
lower
Phase II
Analysis of
More
allowance allocation,
stringent
trade and surrender
by installation
Econometric
33 to 41 MtCO2 over
analysis of the
8 years due to ETS;
impact of the
12% of total
recession on
emissions
Econometric
Up to 10% (100
analysis for a panel
MtCO2) due to
of EU countries
carbon price. Rest
due to other policies
and recession

167

Study
Abrell, et al.,
2011181

Egenhofer, et
al., 2011182

Kettner, et al.,
2011183

Bel and
Joseph,
2015184

Gloaguen and
Alberola,
2013185

181. Jan Abrell et al., Assessing the Impact of the EU ETS Using Firm Level Data 15 (Bruegel
Univ., Working Paper No. 2011/08, 2011).
182. CHRISTIAN EGENHOFER ET AL., CTR. FOR EUR. POL’Y STUD., THE EU EMISSIONS
TRADING SYSTEM AND CLIMATE POLICY TOWARDS 2050: REAL INCENTIVES TO REDUCE
EMISSIONS AND DRIVE INNOVATION? 11 (2011).
183. Claudia Kettner et al., The EU Emission Trading Scheme Allocation Patterns and
Trading Flows 3 (Austrian Inst. of Econ. Research, WIFO Working Papers No. 402, 2011).
184. Germà Bel & Stephan Joseph, Emission Abatement: Untangling the Impacts of the EU
ETS and the Economic Crisis, 49 ENERGY ECON. 531, 538 (2015).
185. Olivier Gloaguen & Emilie Alberola, Assessing the Factors Behind CO2 Emissions
Changes over the Phases 1 and 2 of the EU ETS: An Econometric Analysis 28 (CDC Climat
Research, Working Paper No. 2013–15, 2013).
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Methodology

Emission
Reductions
2005–
2008–
2007
2012
Average decline
3%/year vs about
1%/year to 2004

Comparison of
energy intensity
decline pre and post
2005
National Estimates
Ellerman and
85.5 to
Buchner
121.9
methodology Upper MtCO2e
bound estimates
Norway Difference Nil*
in difference with
plant data
France Difference in Insignifdifference estimates icant
with plant data
Lithuania Difference Nil
in difference
estimates with plant
data
Germany difference Nil
in difference ests. w/
plant data

Study
Ellerman, et
al. 2016186

Ellerman and
Feilhauer,
2008187
Significant

Klemetsen, et
al., 2016188

15.7%
since
2005
Nil

Wagner, et
al., 2014189
Jaraite and
DiMaria,
2016190

20%
Petrick and
reduction Wagner,
2014191

186. A. Denny Ellerman et al., The European Union Emissions Trading System: Ten Years
and Counting, 10 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 89, 96–103 (2016).
187. A. Denny Ellerman & Stephan Feilhauer, A Top-Down and Bottom-Up Look at
Emissions Abatement in Germany in Response to the EU ETS 13 (Mass. Inst. of Tech. Ctr. for
Energy & Envtl. Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. 08-017, 2008).
188. See Klemetsen et al., supra note 176, at 38 (“Our estimation results suggest that the ETS
may have led to significant emission reductions in the second phase (2008–12). However, we do
not find any significant effects in the first phase (2005–07) or the third phase (2013).”). Also note
that although Norway had an ETS with a design very similar to that of the EU ETS, it was not
part of the EU ETS until 2008.
189. Ulrich J. Wagner et al., The Causal Effects of the European Union Emissions Trading
Scheme: Evidence from French Manufacturing Plants 20 (2014) (on file with IZA Inst. of Labor
Econ.), http://conference.iza.org/conference_files/EnvEmpl2014/martin_r7617.pdf.
190. J rate Jaraite & Corrado Di Maria, Did the EU ETS Make a Difference? An Empirical
Assessment Using Lithuanian Firm-Level Data, 37 ENERGY J. 1, 20 (2016).
191. Sebastian Petrick & Ulrich J. Wagner, The Impact of Carbon Trading on Industry:
Evidence from German Manufacturing Firms 34 (Kiel Inst. for the World Econ., Working Paper
No. 1912, 2014).
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These studies indicate that the ETS reduced emissions relative to
business-as-usual during its first phase. Those reductions appear to
have been achieved mainly through fuel switching and efficiency
measures in the power sector (about 60% of total emissions covered),
with limited contributions by the industrial sectors.
Emission reductions during the second phase were larger, with
industrial facilities contributing to the results. Other policies and
economic developments make it very difficult to estimate the share of
the reductions attributable to the ETS. During this period, EU
implemented policies to achieve a 20% share of total energy
consumption from renewable energy and a 20% improvement in
energy efficiency to help achieve its target of a 20% reduction of GHG
emissions from 1990 levels by 2020. A major recession in 2009 and
changes to the relative prices of coal and natural gas over the period
also affected emissions. 192 Gloaguen and Alberola attribute a
maximum of 10% of the reductions to the carbon price, but the ETS
may also impact their energy efficiency variable, which accounts for a
further 10% to 20% of the reductions. Results based on plant data,
which compare emissions of ETS participants with those of plants not
covered by the ETS, suggest the ETS contributed to the emission
reductions achieved during Phase II.
Other impacts of the ETS, including employment, output,
investment, profits, prices, leakage, and innovation, also have been the
subject of multiple studies. 193 In general, they find minimal, if any,
adverse impacts together with shifts in investment, employment, and
innovation toward less emitting activities.
D. Summary
We were able to compile emissions data for 10 ETSs covering 45
jurisdictions. Actual emissions declined for at least six of those ETSs.
Emissions covered by the Alberta and New Zealand systems increased.
It is clear that the 2009 recession, changes in the relative prices of coal
192. See Nicholas Berghmans et al., The CO2 Emissions of the European Power Sector:
Economic Drivers and the Climate-Energy Policies’ Contribution 12 (CDC Climat Research,
Working Paper No. 2014-17, 2014) (showing natural gas prices rising while coal prices declined
slightly, providing an incentive for greater use of coal and hence increased emissions).
193. Several studies provide helpful summaries. See, e.g., Ralf Martin et al., The Impact of the
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme on Regulated Firms: What is the Evidence after Ten
Years? 10 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 129, 136–45 (2015); Tim Liang et al., Assessing the
Effectiveness of the EU Emissions Trading System (Ctr. for Climate Change Econ. & Pol’y,
Working Paper No. 126, 2013).
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and natural gas, renewable energy and energy efficiency initiatives, and
the nuclear plant shutdown following the great east Japan earthquake
and tsunami have had significant impacts on the emissions covered by
several of the ETSs.
All of the ETSs for which data are available have accumulated
surplus allowances—some equivalent to more than a year’s emissions.
Most of those ETSs have implemented measures to reduce the surplus.
In many cases, however, emissions continue to decline faster than the
cap. Several of the ETSs have adopted market stability mechanisms to
routinely remove surplus allowances from the market and inject
allowances into the market when they are scarce. Data on the
performance of these mechanisms are not yet available.
Other studies have attempted to estimate the emission reductions
that can be attributed to the ETS. Murray and Maniloff estimate that
RGGI was responsible for about half of the emissions reduction
between 2009 and 2012. Several studies of the EU ETS suggest that
emissions were reduced relative to business-as-usual during 2005–07,
with most of the reductions due to fuel switching and efficiency
measures in the power sector. Numerous studies conclude that the
2008–12 reductions were larger, with industrial facilities contributing
to the results.
Assessments of the New Zealand and Swiss systems conclude that
uncertainty adversely affected their performance. The uncertainty
created by the challenge to the legality of the California ETS reduced
the allowances sold at the May 2016 auction by almost 90%. The court
decision affirmed the legality of the ETS.
VI. COMPARISON OF ACTUAL CARBON TAXES AND GHG ETSS
Existing carbon taxes and GHG ETSs are compared in Table 12
using the criteria proposed in Section III. ETSs perform better than
carbon taxes on the principal criteria. Actual emission reductions are
more common for ETSs, and the marginal cost is generally
substantially lower. On average, ETSs cover a slightly larger share of
the jurisdiction’s GHG emissions. That assessment is subject to several
caveats: First, some carbon taxes achieve emission reductions at
marginal costs comparable to those of ETSs. Additionally, a few ETSs
have not achieved emission reductions, and the observed emission
reductions cannot be attributed solely to the ETS or tax. Evidence
presented in section IV.B.3 suggests that other policies contributed
significantly to the reductions of non-ETS emissions achieved by
European countries with carbon taxes. Studies reviewed in section V.C
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indicate that other policies and economic developments likewise have
helped reduce emission covered by GHG ETSs. Finally, ETSs and
taxes are not included in the comparison due to lack of data.
Table 12. Comparison of Existing Carbon Taxes and GHG ETSs
Criterion
Carbon Taxes
GHG ETSs
Principal
Criteria
At least six of ten ETSs
6 of 17 taxes in 12
covering forty-one
jurisdictions have
jurisdictions have
reduced actual
emissions since the start reduced actual
emissions since
of the tax. Other
inception of the ETS.
Environmental policies probably
responsible for the
Other policies
effectiveness:
reductions of most
contribute, but their
Reduction of
European taxes.
share generally is not
actual
known.
emissions in
the jurisdiction Shares of the
Shares of the
jurisdiction’s emissions jurisdiction’s emissions
covered ranges from 3% covered ranges from
to 70% with a weighted 18% to 85% with a
average of 45.7%
weighted average of
48.0%
Tax rates range from < Allowance prices range
CostUSD 1 to USD 140 with from < USD 1 to USD
effectiveness:
24 with a weighted
a weighted average of
low marginal
average of USD 7.79
USD 13.04 per tCO2
abatement cost
per tCO2
Secondary
Criteria
Economic
Tax rates are stable but Many ETSs include
efficiency: Low can change with
provisions to enhance
price volatility relatively little notice
price stability and larger
ETSs tend to have
options and/or futures
contracts that enable
sources to obtain
allowances at an agreed
price at a future date
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Criterion
Economic
efficiency:
price signal
commitment
into the future

Economic
efficiency:
harmonization
of marginal
costs across
jurisdictions

Carbon Taxes
Commitments to future
tax rates tend to be
limited to 3 to 5 years
usually when the tax is
introduced. Annual rate
increases occur about
60% of the time.
International
harmonization of tax
rates is very complex
and has never been
attempted in practice

GHG ETSs
Commitments to cap
reductions and price
stability provisions often
span 5 to 8 years and
with emission reduction
targets to 2030 or 2050

Linking ETSs is
common but almost
always subject to
quantitative limits so
price convergence is
limited. Limits are
becoming more
stringent.
Public finance: Carbon taxes raise far
ETSs raise less revenue
revenue raised more revenue that
than taxes because in
ETSs. Most tax revenue many ETSs most
is used for tax cuts and allowances are
rebates or general
distributed free to EITE
revenue. Uses vary
sources. Most revenue is
widely by jurisdiction
used for green purposes,
and change over time.
but this varies widely
across jurisdictions.
Public finance: Cross-jurisdiction
In addition to
crossrevenue flows occur
government transfers,
jurisdiction
through government
linking ETSs leads to
revenue flows budgets
cross-jurisdiction
revenue flows
Administrative Carbon taxes are often An ETS creates several
issues:
relatively easy to
new institutional
institutional
implement because
requirements
capacity
most jurisdictions
already collect taxes on
fossil fuels
Administrative Administrative costs are Administrative costs are
issues:
usually lower for carbon usually higher for ETSs
administrative taxes
costs
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Criterion
Administrative
issues:
difficulty of
making
adjustments to
rules

Carbon Taxes
Changes to the tax rate
or coverage can
typically be made as
part of a budget

Administrative Data on tax avoidance
issues:
are not available
minimization
of corruption

173

GHG ETSs
Changes to the rules
governing an ETS tend
to require changes to
regulations and/or
legislation which often
involves a process of
notice and consultation
Information on the scale
of different forms of
corruption for ETSs is
not available.

Comparison of changes in non-ETS emissions in European
countries with and without a carbon tax since 2008 suggests that the
carbon taxes have had a limited impact in most of those jurisdictions.
Other assessments of carbon taxes confirm that impression. Tax
exemptions, relatively low tax rates (which lead to even smaller price
changes), and modest changes to the tax rates limit the reduction of
actual emissions achieved by carbon taxes. Most of those carbon taxes
apply to residential, commercial, and transportation uses of fossil
fuels—uses where consumers may not respond promptly or fully to the
price changes induced by the tax.
More research is needed to improve instrument design. In the case
of a carbon tax, it is conceptually clear that the tax rate must rise over
time to adjust for inflation, increased income, technological change,
and other factors to achieve further emission reductions. In practice
rate increases for most carbon taxes have exceeded the rate of
inflation, but for most of the taxes, that has not been enough to reduce
emissions. The huge variation in tax rate changes and rates of emission
reduction/increase indicate that this relationship is not well understood
in practice.
Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Slovenia (fluorinated gases
tax only), Switzerland, and Liechtenstein regularly increase the tax rate
at one- to three-year intervals; and
British Columbia, France, Japan, and the UK introduced carbon
taxes with rapid (over 30%/year) tax rate increases for periods of three
to five years. Such rapid tax increases probably are not sustainable.194
194. The tax rates specified in the French legislation—€56/tCO2 in 2020 and €100/tCO2 in
2030—imply that the average annual rate at which the tax rate rises falls from 31% for 2015-2020
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In British Columbia, they were followed by a five-year rate freeze. In
the UK, the tax rate was frozen after three years. What will happen in
other jurisdictions is not yet known.
Many of the ETSs accumulate significant quantities of surplus
(banked) allowances and offset credits. A growing allowance bank
indicates that emissions can be reduced faster than the rate at which
the cap is declining. Since a growing bank depresses the market price,
additional reductions can be achieved at relatively low cost. Many
ETSs have implemented measures to reduce the surplus. Several ETSs
have adopted a market stability reserve to remove excess allowances
from the market when prices are low and release additional allowances
into the market when prices are high. The effectiveness of those
mechanisms will need to be assessed.
All jurisdictions with a carbon tax or GHG ETS have also
implemented other policies that affect the emissions of sources covered
by the instrument. Other policies can be justified if they have different
objectives (e.g., short- vs. long-term emission reductions), they target
different market failures (e.g., pollution abatement vs. technology
innovation), or the carbon price is below the socially optimal level.195
The other policies may not cover the same sources and may affect them
differentially, thus generating interaction effects. 196 Although having
multiple policies to reduce GHG emissions is inefficient, public
opinion favors non-price policies so a portfolio of policies may be
needed to sustain political support for price instruments.197
In the case of an ETS, any reductions achieved by other policies
theoretically can be fully offset by higher emissions within the ETS cap,
resulting in a higher cost for the same emission reduction.198 In the EU,
subsidies for renewable energy are responsible for most of the emission

to less than 14% for 2015–30. See Loi 2015-992 du 17 août 2015 relative à la transition énergétique
pour la croissance verte [Law 2015-992 of August 17, 2015 on Energy Transition for Green
Growth], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICAL GAZETTE OF
FRANCE], Aug. 18, 2015, p. 14263.
195. Michael Mehling & Endre Tvinnereim, Carbon Pricing and the 1.5°C Target: Near-Term
Decarbonisation and the Importance of an Instrument Mix, 12 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 50,
57–59 (2018); Michael Hoel, Second-Best Climate Policy 2–3 (Univ. of Oslo, Dep’t of Econ.,
Memorandum No. 04/2012, 2012), http://www.sv.uio.no/econ/english/research/unpublishedworks/working-papers/2012/memo042012.html; WORLD BANK CARBON PRICING LEADERSHIP
COAL., supra note 77, at 15–24.
196. See generally Wytze van der Gaast et al., Effects of Interactions Between EU Climate and
Energy Policies (CARISMA, Working Documents No. 3, 2016) (discussing various case studies
of the interactions between energy policies within different European countries).
197. BARRY G. RABE, CAN WE PRICE CARBON? 24, 194, 208 (2018).
198. Schmalensee & Stavins, supra note 12, at 17–18.
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reductions in the power sector. 199 In the German power sector, the
combination of the renewable energy policy and EU ETS leads to
larger emissions reductions due to their impacts on the merit order of
fossil-fired generating units. 200 In practice, some of the emission
reductions achieved by other policies are captured by the
removal/cancellation of surplus allowances and more rapid reduction
of the emissions cap.
With respect to the economic efficiency criteria, carbon taxes
provide better short-term price stability but poorer long-term price
signals than ETSs. However, price stability provisions and, where
available, forward contracts and options reduce short-term price
volatility for ETSs. A carbon tax that has a track record of annual or
biannual rate adjustments probably provides a longer-term price signal
comparable to that of the five to eight-year cap reduction commitments
of many ETSs.
Harmonization of tax rates or allowance prices only occurs where
multiple jurisdictions are fully linked or part of the same ETS, as in the
case of the EU ETS, RGGI and California/Quebec. Other ETSs have
links but they are subject to qualitative and quantitative restrictions,
which limit price convergence. Harmonization of effective tax rates
would be very complex in practice and has not been attempted.
Carbon taxes raise significantly more revenue that ETSs. Indeed,
that has been an important motivation for implementing a carbon tax
in some jurisdictions. Many ETSs distribute most of their allowances
free for two reasons: to ease the cost of adjusting to the new regulation,
and to protect the competitiveness of EITE sources.
Free allowances provide an incentive to reduce emissions but
reduce the financial cost of compliance, because a source whose
emissions exceed its free allocation must purchase allowances to cover
the excess, and a source whose emissions are less than its free allocation
can sell its surplus allowances. Carbon taxes address these issues with
exemptions, differential tax rates, and rebates. At least 44% of the
carbon tax revenue is used for tax cuts and rebates. 201 EITE
199. Nicholas Berghmans et al., The CO2 Emissions of the European Power Sector: Economic
Drivers and the Climate-Energy Policies’ Contribution 27 (Inst. for Climate Econ., Working Paper
No. 2014-17, 2014).
200. Hannes Weigt et al., CO2 Abatement from Renewable Energy Injections in the German
Electricity Sector: Does a CO2 Price Help? 27 (KULeuven Energy Inst., Working Paper EN2012002, 2012).
201. Carl & Fedor, supra note 59, at 52. The percentages reported do not sum to 100. When
the percentages are calculated to sum to 100, roughly 50% goes to tax cuts and rebates. Rebates
probably go to entities, such EITE firms, subject to the tax while tax cuts are reductions of other
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exemptions might contribute to the lower share of emissions covered
by taxes.
The ability of ETSs to facilitate cross jurisdictional financial
transfers via allowance/offset purchases is interesting, but ETSs that
allowed such imports, including the EU, Switzerland and New
Zealand, have severely restricted their use. The newer ETSs in China
and South Korea prohibit or tightly control imports of allowances and
offsets from foreign jurisdictions.
A carbon tax is usually easier to implement and less costly to
administer than an ETS. An ETS requires a new administrative
infrastructure including: an emissions MRV system; institutions to
distribute allowances, enforce compliance, and monitor the allowance
market; and a computer registry to track allowance holdings. A carbon
tax is usually applied to fossil fuels which are already subject to various
taxes. Adding a carbon tax may involve changes to the MRV system
and compliance enforcement. Extending the carbon tax beyond fossil
fuels increases its complexity and administrative cost. Although the
administrative costs of an ETS are generally considered to be higher
than those for a carbon tax, the proliferation of ETSs indicates
administrative costs are not a significant barrier.
It is interesting to note that ETSs are much more common for subnational jurisdictions than carbon taxes despite the extra
administrative capacity they require. The sub-national ETSs are found
in Canada, China and the US, and the choice of an ETS might be
influenced by the constitutional distribution of taxing authority in
those countries.
VII. CONCLUSION
Carbon taxes and GHG ETSs are becoming increasingly common
and now cover over 20% of global emissions. The first carbon taxes
date from 1990 and the first GHG ETS still operating dates from 2005.
Since 2005, implementation of ETSs has spread more rapidly. They
now cover substantially more jurisdictions and more emissions than
carbon taxes. Their designs vary widely. The instrument choice and
design are affected by circumstances unique to the jurisdiction, such as
its emissions profile, constitutional provisions, economic structure, and
other policies.

taxes. Carl and Fedor group them even though the public finance and economic impacts are quite
different.
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At the end of 2015, 17 GHG ETSs were operational in 55
jurisdictions, while 18 jurisdictions collected at least one carbon tax.
Despite the number of taxes and ETSs implemented and the fact that
several have been in effect for over a decade, relatively little is known
about their actual performance.
Both carbon taxes and GHG ETSs have demonstrated that they
can reduce emissions from business-as-usual. This paper proposes and
applies the more stringent criterion of a reduction of actual emissions
subject to the instrument. That approach permits assessment of more
carbon taxes over longer time periods. It is also more consistent with
the emissions targets of most jurisdictions that have implemented a
carbon tax and/or ETS. The business-as-usual emissions reductions
achieved are rarely sufficient to lower actual emissions.
So far, reductions of actual emissions are more common for ETSs
than taxes, and, on average, allowance prices are lower than carbon tax
rates. The observed emission reductions cannot be attributed solely to
the ETS or tax. Other policies and other developments affect the
emissions covered by the instruments. The effects of the 2009 economic
recession and the nuclear plant shutdown after the great east Japan
earthquake and tsunami are evident in the data. Additionally, data for
EU countries suggest that the policies to improve energy efficiency and
increase the supply of renewable energy have contributed to the
declining emissions subject to both carbon taxes and the EU ETS.
More rigorous analysis is needed to determine the emission reductions
that can be attributed to the instruments.
The smaller emission reductions with higher marginal costs for
carbon taxes may reflect the sources to which carbon taxes and GHG
ETSs are applied. Carbon taxes tend to apply to fossil fuels with limited
coverage of energy and industrial sources while the opposite is true for
ETSs. The low price elasticity of demand for fossil fuels means that
reduction of the associated emissions may require larger price changes
(higher carbon taxes) and take longer than energy and industrial
emission reductions covered by ETSs.
Measures to improve effectiveness are being developed and
diffused more quickly for ETSs than for carbon taxes. Most ETSs have
increased the share of allowances auctioned, adopted declining
emissions caps, specified future caps and floor prices several years into
the future, shifted to benchmarking for free EITE allowances, reduced
the accessibility of foreign offset credits, and established market
stability reserves. Experience has been shared bilaterally and via
dedicated institutions including the International Carbon Action
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Partnership (ICAP), Western Climate Initiative, and Partnership for
Market Readiness (PMR).202
In contrast, there has been virtually no change to the design of
carbon taxes. Adjustments to the tax rate are unpredictable after the
introductory period in most jurisdictions. We found no jurisdiction that
regularly reports emissions by sources subject to its carbon tax(es).
Very few jurisdictions regularly assess the effectiveness of the tax in
achieving their emission reduction targets. Moreover, there is little
evidence of shared learning based on experience, although the
Partnership for Market Readiness is developing materials on the
design and implementation of carbon taxes.
Interesting patterns for which we do not have an explanation
include:
Most carbon taxes are implemented by national jurisdictions in
countries that also have an ETS—countries that are part of the EU
ETS and Switzerland. On the other hand, roughly the same number of
countries that participate in the EU ETS do not have a carbon tax; and
Despite the greater administrative infrastructure required by an
ETS, they are much more common than carbon taxes for sub-national
jurisdictions. That may reflect the constitutional distribution of taxing
authority in Canada, China and the US. In any case, the extra
administrative demands are not a significant practical barrier to
implementation of an ETS.
Topics that warrant further research to improve the effectiveness
of these instruments include: the characteristics of a tax rate strategy
that leads to actual emission reductions; the level of the tax rate needed
to have an impact on emissions, the frequency and magnitude of tax
rate changes needed to achieve continual reductions efficiently, and
the commitments to future tax rates that provide credible price signals
for mitigation investments; The most effective treatment of EITE
sources under each instrument (is allocation of free allowances under
an ETS more effective than an exemption/rebate under a tax?); and
the design features of an effective ETS (do a commitment to a declining
annual cap, price stability provisions, market stability reserve, links
with other ETSs, or other features have a significant impact on the
emission reductions achieved?)

202. See generally THE EVOLUTION OF CARBON MARKETS: DESIGN AND DIFFUSION
(Jørgen Wettestad & Lars H. Gulbrandsen eds., 2017).
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Research on effective portfolios of price and non-price
instruments is needed. All jurisdictions with a carbon tax or GHG ETS
have also implemented other policies that affect the emissions of
sources covered by the instrument. There are sound theoretical and
practical reasons for using multiple price and non-price instruments to
address climate change. Use of multiple instruments produces complex
interactive and distributional effects. While economically inefficient, a
portfolio of price and non-price policies may be needed to sustain
political support for price instruments.203
Both carbon taxes and GHG ETSs have demonstrated that they
can reduce emissions. Implementation of both instruments is
spreading. Given evidence available from existing instruments, it is
time to learn from that experience to make both more effective so that
they can better contribute to the effort to reduce global GHG
emissions.

203. See RABE, supra note 197, at 24 (“[C]arbon pricing policies consistently have the most
limited base of political support among a wide range of policy options to reduce carbon
emissions.”).
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Annex 1. Tax Revenue, Tax Rate, and Estimated Emissions by
Jurisdiction and Tax, 1991 to 2016

British
Columbia

Slovenia

Denmark

Sweden

Revenue (EUR in millions)
Tax on CO2 Tax Rate (EUR/tCO2)
Emissions (ktCO2)
Tax on
Revenue (EUR in millions)
Fluorinated Tax Rate (EUR/tCO2)
Gases
Emissions (ktCO2)
Revenue (CAD in millions)
Carbon Tax Tax Rate (CAD/tCO2)
Emissions (ktCO2)

Tax
Revenue (NOK in millions)
CO2 Tax on
Tax Rate (NOK/tCO2)
Mineral Oil
Emissions (ktCO2)
Tax on CO2 Revenue (NOK in millions)
Emissions in
Tax Rate (NOK/tCO2)
Petroleum
Activities Emissions (ktCO2)
Revenue (NOK in millions)
Tax on HFCs
Tax Rate (NOK/tCO2)
and PFCs
Emissions (ktCO2)
Revenue (SEK in millions)
Tax on CO2 Tax Rate (SEK/tCO2)
Emissions (ktCO2)
Revenue (DKK in millions)
Duty on CO2 Tax Rate (DKK/tCO2)
Emissions (ktCO2)
Tax on
Revenue (DKK in millions)
Fluorinated Tax Rate (DKK/tCO2)
Gases
Emissions (ktCO2)
34
13
2,678

8,077
176
190
926
24,744
920
26,896
5,086
90
56,508

7,801
167
186
898
25,535
910
28,060
5,151
90
57,236

46
13
3,669

421

3,404

3,351
430

2006
4,366
199
21,935

2005
3,899
195
19,966

27
13
2,187

8,158
222
194
1,144
25,127
930
27,018
5,108
90
56,760

415

3,385

2007
4,469
203
22,037

30
13
2,400

542
15
36,133

306
10
30,600

9,608
236
205
1,151
26,085
1,050
24,843
5,006
150
33,371

231

2,215

2009
4,442
214
20,751

30
13
2,400

15,092
249
199
1,251
25,639
1,010
25,385
5,056
90
56,182

225

3,392

2008
4,453
207
21,559

30
13
2,392
1
3
472
959
25
38,360

1
1
408
741
20
37,050

9,554
258
212
1,214
25,369
1,050
24,161
5,882
156
37,703

229

2,189

2011
4,719
222
21,298

31
13
2,480

9,346
255
209
1,222
27,334
1,050
26,032
5,822
153
38,052

232

2,166

2010
4,682
218
21,495

2
5
354
1,120
30
37,333

57
13
4,544

9,817
277
225
1,231
25,243
1,050
24,041
5,709
160
35,683

229

2,251

2012
4,349
225
19,301

1
3
281
1,198
30
39,933

201
100
2,008
106
14
7,361

214
100
2,135
106
14
7,361
2
10
190
1,222
30
40,733

10,286
355
330
1,076
23,333
1,050
22,222
3,524
167
21,100

445

4,576

2014
5,167
330
15,635

7,437
282
229
1,231
24,031
1,050
22,887
5,762
164
35,132

443

3,293

2013
4,913
229
21,446

1
3
337
1,190
30
39,667

365
100
3,653
124
17
7,176

10,818
345
354
975
24,604
1,130
21,773
3,652
170
21,480

453

4,906

2015
5,965
338
17,648

1
3
200
1,220
30
40,667

408
100
4,079
132
17
7,630

11,204
404
383
1,055
24,139
1,130
21,362
3,577
190
18,828

457

5,116

2016
6,464
346
18,709

Fall 2018]

Norway

Jurisdiction
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